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I. INTRODUCTION
Globally harmonized prudential regulation and internationally
driven secured transactions law reforms chart the normative premises
sustaining credit-based economies. Oscillating between the need of
expanding credit creation to promote economic growth and the
urgency of controlling the excessive accumulation of debt, modern
economies depend on private law rules and regulatory provisions that
originate in different fora of the international lawmaking arena. Under
the auspices and guidance of international organizations concerned
with the alleviation of poverty, 1 a growing number of jurisdictions
across the globe have embarked – or are embarking – upon substantial
legal reforms to facilitate credit expansion and financial inclusion
through the establishment of proprietary entitlements, known as

1 . The efforts to harmonize and modernize secured transactions law contribute to
achieving the first (“end poverty in all its forms everywhere”) of the seventeen sustainable
development goals to be reached by 2030 by the international community; G.A. Res. 70/1, at
15 (Oct. 21, 2015). The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Addis Ababa Action
Agenda reiterating the relevance of international legal harmonization to reduce poverty and
inequalities; G.A. Res. 69/313, ¶ 89 (Aug. 17, 2015).
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“security interests” or “security rights,” over personal property. 2 In
essence, secured transactions law reforms aim at equipping creditors
and debtors with legal tools that effectively reduce credit risk by
placing secured creditors in a priority position vis-à-vis unsecured
creditors and competing claimants. 3 Prudential regulation, through
international regulatory standards, sets forth the amount of capital that
– relative to the total investments and in proportion to the risks
acquired – regulated deposit-taking institutions, for simplicity banks,
must not fund with borrowed money. 4 The overarching aim is to
2. The list of countries that, in pursuit of these goals, have reformed or are in the process
of reforming their secured transactions laws is lengthy and ranges across six continents,
animating vibrant scholarly debates and policy analyses. For a forward-looking analysis of the
development of secured transactions law internationally and comparatively, see generally
Symposium, Secured Transactions Law in the 21st Century, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(Charles W. Mooney, Steven L. Schwarcz & Giuliano G. Castellano, special eds., 2018). For a
critical account of the issues concerning secured transactions law reforms in several
jurisdictions, see generally SECURED FINANCING IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (Frederique
Dahan ed., 2015). For an examination of the economic effect of secured transactions law
reforms in developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, see, e.g., Boris Kozolchyk,
Secured Lending and Its Poverty Reduction Effect, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 727 (2007). For an
analysis of the reform debate in Europe, see, e.g., Tibor Tajti, Could Continental Europe Adopt
a Uniform Commercial Code Article 9-type Secured Transactions System? The Effects of the
Differing Legal Platforms, 35 ADEL. L. REV. 149 (2014). For an overview of the main issues
affecting the reform debate at the national level in the United Kingdom, see, e.g., HUGH
BEALE ET AL., THE LAW OF SECURITY AND TITLE-BASED FINANCING ¶¶ 23.01-23.22 (2d ed.
2012).
3 . The core purpose of curbing credit risk associated to secured transactions is
recognized in virtually any legal system. In the United States, see LYNN M. LOPUCKI &
ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH xxxi (7th ed. 2012); Ronald J.
Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 646 (1997); Grant
Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 29 (1951). In Canada, see RONALD C. CUMING, CATHERINE WALSH &
RODERICK J. WOOD, PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY LAW 1 (2005). Under English law, see
BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, ¶ 1.09; SIR ROY GOODE, GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
CREDIT AND SECURITY ¶ 1-01 (Louise Gullifer ed., 5th ed. 2013). The core legal body of the
U.N. system, i.e. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
consider the reduction of credit risk associated to secured transactions as essential to promote
access to credit worldwide. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL),
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 2 (2008) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE]
(noting that “[r]isk is reduced because credit secured by assets gives creditors access to the
assets as another source of recovery in the event of non-payment of the secured obligation”).
4. In common parlance, capital requirements are often referred to as the capital that
banks should “set aside.” This locution should be used with the caveat that capital
requirements do not demand banks to hold some portion of their deposits, which is what
“liquidity requirements” and “reserves” (outside the scope of this Article) impose. Instead,
capital for banks is what other firms is term as “equity” and equity-like instruments, i.e. “own
funds.” This point is eloquently illustrated by ANAT R. ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE
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ensure that banks maintain sufficient funds to insulate depositors from
unexpected losses and promote financial stability by controlling the
level of risk taken by banks. 5 These branches of law intersect when
banks secure the repayment of loans with collateral. Yet, from a
regulatory perspective, not all security rights are considered to offer
sufficient protection against credit risk.
An inconsistency, if not a fully-fledged paradox, surfaces in the
international and national legal frameworks governing credit: core
legal devices designed by private law rules to reduce credit risk may
be considered, under capital requirements, inapt to curb credit risk
and, thus, equated to unsecured credit. At first blush, the different
treatments of collateral may appear symptomatic of a clash between
broad policy objectives, namely, economic growth (stimulated
through access to credit) and financial stability. A closer examination,
however, reveals a tension that is more profound than a mere
balancing exercise between two policy objectives.
The main argument of this Article is that dissonances between
secured transactions law and capital requirements stem from their
different ethoi and hinder both access to credit and financial stability
worldwide. To sustain this argument and advance the debate in both
fields of law,6 it is necessary, first, to isolate the rationales and the
BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 6-7
(2014).
5 . See HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY AND REGULATION 575 (21st ed. 2016); RICHARD S. CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY
& GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 251 (4th ed.
2009); Michael B. Gordy, Erik A. Heitfield & Jason Wu, Risk-Based Regulatory Capital and
the Basel Accords, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 550-66 (Allen N. Berger et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2014); JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 290-315
(2016).
6. In spite of the decades-old plea for a deeper coordination, the intersection between
these two sets of norms has not been the object of scrupulous investigations. In particular, Sir
Roy Goode noted: “[t]he harmonisation of private law affecting credit will lose much of its
value if it does not proceed hand in hand with harmonisation of public regulation.” Roy Goode,
A Credit Law for Europe?, 23 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 227, 236 (1974). The debate has been
recently reinvigorated by new evidence indicating the role of secured transactions law and
capital requirements in creating credit. See Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Credit
Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming 2018). UNCITRAL has recently recognized the relevance of the issue and future
work that results in a text containing specific guidance to national regulatory authorities on
capital requirements. See Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Coordinating Secured
Transactions Law and Capital Requirements in U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW,
MODERNISING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW TO SUPPORT INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABLE
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operational logics of secured transactions law and capital
requirements. The narrative sustaining and justifying the law of
secured transactions is rooted in the idea that security interests,
especially those in personal property, are the core engine for
economic growth as they redress the problem of “dead capital;” 7 that
is, the mismatch between the assets held by individuals or companies
and the assets that financiers are willing to accept as collateral.
Through this lens, international organizations have been actively
engaged in promoting law reforms that establish legal regimes that
facilitate the conversion of dead capital into productive capital. The
underlying assumption is that by preferring secured creditors over
unsecured creditors, the use of collateral is facilitated and more credit
is extended at a lower cost. Hence, law reformers strive to design a
legal regime in which creditors and debtors are able to negotiate the
terms of their consensual transactions to fit their idiosyncratic
financing needs and risk appetites, while mandatory rules are largely
imposed having in view the effects of security rights on third parties.
As illustrated in this Article, such a rationale permeates national laws
and the international legal standards adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”). 8
Capital requirements follow a different rationale that is
encapsulated in their preventive, or prudential, function. They are
defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel
Committee) – housed in the Bank for International Settlements
(“BIS”) – to ensure capital adequacy of internationally active banks. 9
DEVELOPMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 166, (Vienna, 4-6 July 2017), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/congress/17-06783_ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TGS-79FK] (archived Mar. 1, 2018);
REPORT of the U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), on its Fiftieth Session (321 July 2017), ¶¶ 222-23 U.N. Doc A/72/17 (2017).
7. The term was coined by the economist Hernando de Soto. See HERNANDO DE SOTO,
THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS
EVERYWHERE ELSE (3d ed. 2000).
8. On the origins of UNCITRAL and its early work, see generally John Carey,
UNCITRAL: Its Origins and Prospects, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 626 (1967); Allan E. Farnsworth,
UNCITRAL-Why? What? How? When?, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 314 (1972). On the EBRD, see
Steven Weber, Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 48 INT’L
ORG. 1 (1994).
9 . On the genesis of the Basel Committee, see CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS 1974–1997 (2011).
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When transposed into national legal systems, capital requirements are
imposed on credit institutions with the intent of preventing excessive
risk-taking, which may have detrimental implications for the stability
of individual banks and the entire financial system. 10 This translates
into two main areas of regulatory intervention, consisting of microprudential and macro-prudential regulation, and concerning,
respectively, the solvency of individual banks and the stability of the
entire financial system. Upon these premises, mandatory requirements
are established, imposing a statutory limit on the ratio of “unborrowed” funds, such as equity, to borrowed funds, such as deposits.
The amount and the composition of banks’ own capital is calculated
against the risks posed by their operations. By controlling the risk
associated with lending, capital requirements influence the lending
choices of individual banks, which may divert their funds towards
activities subject to lower capital requirements. 11
The two aforementioned rationales develop into distinctive
operational logics. Security instruments are consensual arrangements
established to curb credit risk. They are governed by private law rules
that are concerned with the nexus of rights and obligations created
through a security agreement. In contrast, capital requirements are
regulatory provisions that focus on the internal processes that banks
must deploy to evaluate the riskiness of any given lending operation,
with or without collateral, in order to determine the corresponding
capital charge. Accordingly, the law pertaining to secured transactions
assumes that, inasmuch as private law rules are conducive to private
negotiations, a security right reduces credit risk. Whereas, capital
requirements are designed to control the level of risk taken by
individual banks and consider collateral to reduce credit risk only if
On the Basel Committee’s role within the modern global governance system, see CHRIS
BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW AND FINANCIAL
ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 99-102 (2014).
10. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 87; Gordy, Heitfield & Wu, supra note 5,
at 550.
11. For an accurate analysis of the incentives created by capital regulation in the context
of the Global Financial Crisis, see generally Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the
International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel
Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 3 (2014). See also Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation:
Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, supra note 6 (noting that international capital
requirements affect the cost of creating new loans and the lack of coordination with secured
transactions law distorts the incentive for providing commercial loans).
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specific statutory criteria are met. Hence, when secured transactions
law and capital requirements are approached in a compartmentalized
fashion, a hiatus emerges that, in turn, manifests itself in two distinct
understandings of what constitutes an effective protection against
credit risk.
To address this gap, this Article examines the regulatory
treatment of security rights in personal property with primary
reference to international legal and regulatory standards. The
provisions enshrined in the UNCITRAL and the EBRD model laws
are measured against the requisites that collateralized transactions
must satisfy in order to benefit from discounted capital charges,
pursuant to the Second Basel Capital Accord (“Basel II”) 12 and the
Third Basel Capital Accord (“Basel III”). 13 Given the different levels
of implementation of these standards at the national level, different
methodological approaches are required to investigate their
interaction. Secured transactions laws of selected jurisdictions –
belonging to civil law and common law legal families – are
considered. Specific attention is given to legal and regulatory
frameworks of the European Union and its Member States. In the EU,
in fact, secured transactions laws are disharmonized while capital
requirements are harmonized and largely based on Basel II that is, in
turn, applied to any credit institution operating in the European single
market through the Capital Requirements Directive IV (“CRD IV”)
and the Capital Requirements Regulation (“CRR”). 14 Where
departing from international principles, Belgian, English, French and
12. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED
FRAMEWORK (rev. 2006) [hereinafter BASEL II].
13. The process to amend Basel II started in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial
crisis, leading, in 2011, to the adoption of the first instrument that eventually became known as
Basel III. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (rev.
2011) [hereinafter BASEL III (2011)]. In December 2017, after extensive negotiations, Basel III
has been completed and its final version was formally adopted. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS (2017) [hereinafter
BASEL III].
14. Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June
2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms, Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and Repealing Directives
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. L 176/338 [hereinafter CRD IV]; Council Regulation
575/2013, on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and
Amending Regulation 648/2012, 2013 O.J. L 176/1 [hereinafter CRR].
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Italian laws governing non-possessory security rights over tangibles,
financial assets and receivables are examined through the prism of the
principles established by the CRR. This systematic approach allows
us to identify specific dissonances between secured transactions law
and capital requirements. These dissonances affect the terms of a
security agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties, the public
filing regime for security rights and their enforcement. As illustrated
in detail in this Article, the uncoordinated intersection between these
two branches of law hinders the effectiveness of reforms aimed at
expanding access to credit and inducing the development of
unregulated credit markets.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II, in
defining the boundaries of this investigation, unveils the hiatus
between the rationales and the inner logics underpinning personal
property secured transactions law and prudential regulation. Part III
focuses on the intersection between the two areas by examining the
regulatory treatment of security rights in receivables, financial
collateral and tangible assets. Part IV offers an analysis of the
consequences of the uncoordinated coexistence of secured
transactions laws and capital requirements on access to credit and
financial stability.
II. TWO RATIONALES
As secured transactions laws of various legal systems undergo a
process of reform and the debate over the recently adopted revision of
harmonized capital requirements has animated the global political
debate, 15 the need for adequate understanding of the interactions
15. As a testament to their local impact, secured transactions law reforms generally hit
the headlines in local news. The international limelight is reserved to the Basel Committee
efforts to furthering the reforms process started in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
The intention is to implement a package of new reforms to complete Basel III. However, the
proposed changes have been perceived so radical that the document presented have been
dubbed as Basel IV. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. Different rounds of negotiations,
amid a mutating political environment, have blocked the process of changes with European
countries and the U.S. often struggling to find an alignment. See, e.g., Caroline Binham & Jim
Brunsden, France Hardens Stance Against Higher Bank Capital Requirements, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/ee8f42eb-422a-3dc9-92a2-8ceb7d9fb4ef; JuliaAmbra Verlaine, Global Financial Regulation Faces Uncertain Future After Trump’s Order,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-financial-regulation-facesuncertain-future-after-trumps-order-1486405041; Caroline Binham & Emma Dunkley, Basel
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between these two fields of law intensifies. The tension between the
policy objectives pursued by secured transactions laws and prudential
regulation offers only a superficial explanation of the chasm
separating these two sets of legal rules.
It is acknowledged that secured transactions law chiefly aims at
broadening access to credit, promoting economic growth; whereas,
prudential regulation focuses on curbing the risks associated with
lending operations in order to ensure financial stability. However, if
the inconsistencies resulting from this divide are reduced to a clash
between policy objectives, advancements in the discourse would be
obstructed by an alleged dichotomy between economic growth and
financial stability. Following this conceptualization, swift policy
recommendations are often advanced. Depending on the favored
position, a relaxation of capital requirements may be suggested,
arguably to promote economic growth, 16 or the desirability of
comprehensive legal reforms to support credit creation may be
questioned, supposedly with the intent of inducing financial stability.
This understanding, however, results in a practical impasse, given that
it is assumed that the two objectives cannot be achieved
simultaneously. More profoundly, it neglects that stability is a
precondition for sustained growth. 17 These two overarching
Postpones Bank Reform Vote Amid Policy Differences, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2017,
https://www.ft.com/content/589f1ce0-d1a1-11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51. Finally, on December 7,
2017, the oversight body of the Basel Committee, i.e. the Governors and Heads of Supervision,
announced the completion of Basel III, signaling that a political agreement has been reached
over the reform process initiated after the global financial crisis. See Press Release, Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, Governors and Heads of Supervision Finalise Basel III
Reforms (December 7, 2017).
16. As reported by ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 9, a plea for a relaxation of
capital requirements is often vented by the industry. This stance is also manifested in the
industry’s responses to public consultations concerning international capital requirements. In
this respect, the Basel Committee often took into account whether different proposals for
reform have a negative impact on lending to small business. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: REVISIONS TO THE STANDARDISED
APPROACH FOR CREDIT RISK 10 (2015) [hereinafter CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT]. More
recently, it has been often advanced the idea that capital regulation is holding back economic
growth by limiting lending activities or that with new capital requirements banks would be
“forced” to limit lending activities; see, e.g., Gernot Heller, G20 Review of Banking Rules No
Rollback of Regulation: Weidmann, REUTERS Mar. 19, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-g20-germany-weidmann-idUSKBN16Q0L5 [https://perma.cc/UW85-Z59W] (archived Mar.
1, 2018).
17. The point is clearly illustrated with reference to the 2007-2009 financial crisis by
ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 5.
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objectives are, in fact, interwoven, as the Financial Sector Assessment
Program (“FSAP”) of the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank highlights. 18 According to the FSAP, secured credit and the
protection of creditors’ rights are core components of the legal
framework sustaining the soundness of financial systems. 19 More
specifically, a modern legal regime for secured transactions is
considered to be a factor that facilitates stable economic growth and
recovery, especially when it expands financing opportunities for small
and medium-sized enterprises. 20 In a similar vein, balancing financial
stability and economic growth underscores the definition of an
optimal level of mandatory capital reserves that banks must hold.21
Hence, capital requirements aim at ensuring the stability of both
individual banks and the banking system as a whole, without stifling
banks’ ability to support credit-based economies. In the aftermath of
recent financial crises, concerns over financial stability animated the
international policy agenda and led to questions of whether capital
requirements have been excessively low, thereby resulting in a call
for the reassessment of the Basel Accords. 22 Although a first wave of
changes contained in the first Basel III instrument adopted in 2011
addressed a number of significant issues, negotiations concerning
more fundamental aspects have been completed only after several

18. See IMF, Review of the Financial Sector Assessment Program: Further Adaptation
to the Post-Crisis Era Policy Paper, (Sept. 2014), http://www.imf.org/external/np/
pp/eng/2014/081814.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB6Z-SL5A] (archived Mar. 1, 2018).
19. IMF & WORLD BANK, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook 230 (2005).
20. See Spiros V. Bazinas, Richard M. Kohn & Louis F. Del Duca, Facilitating a CostFree Path to Economic Recovery—Implementing a Global Uniform International Receivables
Financing Law, 44 UCC L. J. 277, 279 (2012) (noting that the possibility of securing loans
with personal property is essential to stimulate economic growth and recovery in developed
and developing economies alike). See EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, REPORT ON SMES
AND SME SUPPORTING FACTOR (2016). In Europe, economic growth and recovery have been
linked to the availability of financing for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), given
that ninety-nine out of one hundred businesses in Europe are SMEs. On the benefits of secured
transactions law for SMEs and micro-businesses, see Kozolchyk, supra note 2, at 731 (noting
that “where commercial credit is available to small- and medium-sized enterprises, microenterprises can also become its beneficiaries and poverty is thereby further alleviated”).
21. IMF, Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital Staff Discussion Note No. SDN/16/04,
(Mar. 2016).
22. A study conducted by IMF staff members suggests that doubling, and in certain cases
tripling, capital requirements would have been sufficient to absorb losses in most of the past
banking crises. Id. at 20.
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years of extensive consultations. 23 With the adoption of the final
version of Basel III in 2017, the Basel Committee initiated the
implementation phase. Notwithstanding the efforts to enhance both
accuracy and precision in the mechanisms to calculate capital
requirements, the Basel framework for personal property collateral
remains largely unaffected by the recent reforms and, as such, is still
anchored to the framework established prior to the recent financial
crises.
At the root of the hiatus between the legal rules governing
secured transactions laws and international regulatory standards are
the radically different rationales and operational logics that generate
dissonances when applied simultaneously, i.e. when banks act as
secured creditors while complying with capital requirements. These
two branches of law are both aimed at reducing credit risk, but they
are characterized by different attitudes towards the level of risk that
the banks are allowed to undertake, as it emerges when their core
mechanisms and evolution are examined.
A. Secured Transactions Law: National Reforms and International
Models
In recent years, national legislators have – more or less
successfully – attempted to reorganize the maze of national rules
governing security rights in personal property. The common
denominator of these reforms is the pursuit of legal simplification and
certainty through a more cohesive apparatus of rules in which
functionally similar secured transactions are subjected to similar legal
23. During the negotiation phase, the proposals advanced by the Basel Committee were
informally labeled as “Basel IV” in consideration of the relevance of the changes that they
entailed. Basel IV typically indicated a package of proposed reforms contained in a series of
documents. The most relevant set of proposals for the purpose of this investigation are
contained in BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SECOND CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT: REVISIONS TO THE STANDARDISED APPROACH FOR CREDIT RISK (2015)
[hereinafter SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT] and in the BASEL COMMITTEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: REDUCING VARIATION IN CREDIT RISKWEIGHTED ASSETS – CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF INTERNAL MODEL APPROACHES (2016)
[hereinafter IRB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT]. Most of the proposals advanced by the Basel
Committee, including those contained in the aforementioned documents, have been ultimately
adopted by the Basel Committee and are included in Basel III. See Marcel Magnus, Benoit
Mesnard & Alienor Duvillet-Margerit, Upgrading the Basel Standards: From Basel III to
Basel IV?, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 18, 2017), for a useful summary of the debate prior
to the final adoption of Basel III.
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treatment and ultimately to a unitary legal framework. 24 Legal
rationalization is ubiquitous in secured transactions law reforms,
regardless of whether national law reformers: (1) intend to emulate
the legal regimes of Canada and the United States that pioneered the
unitary framework lauded by many; 25 (2) were driven by an
international impetus involving the adoption of international
standards, such as those elaborated by the EBRD and UNCITRAL; 26
or (3) explored a different reform strategy. 27 Even within the same
region, legal frameworks are substantially different and countries may
be at different stages of the reform process. In Europe, for instance,
several countries have reformed national laws along the lines of the
EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions (“EBRD Model Law”),

24. Simplification was one of the motivating objectives of the drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) in the United States; see Karl N. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying
Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 687, 690 (1948). For a cogent parallel between the
UCC experience and the international process of harmonization and simplification of secured
transactions law, see Neil B. Cohen, Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The
Next Frontier, 33 TEX. INT’L L. J. 173 (1998).
25. See GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 295 (1965).
This option has influenced the debate in numerous legal systems belonging to different legal
traditions. For instance, in the United Kingdom, see generally Iwan Davies, The Reform of
Personal Property Security Law: Can Article 9 of the US Uniform Commercial Code be a
Precedent?, 37 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 465 (1988). In Central European countries, see Tajti,
supra note 2. In France, see generally, JEAN FRANÇOIS RIFFARD, LE SECURITY INTEREST OU
L’APPROCHE FONCTIONNELLE ET UNITAIRE DES SÛRETÉS MOBILIÈRES: CONTRIBUTION À
UNE RATIONALISATION DU DROIT FRANÇAIS (1997) (Fr.). Finally, in Latin America, see
Marek Dubovec, UCC Article 9 Registration System for Latin America, 28 ARIZONA J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 117 (2011).
26. On the principles of the EBRD MODEL LAW, see infra note 42, see Frederique Dahan,
Law Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: The Transplantation of Secured Transactions
Laws, 2 EUR J. L. REFORM 369 (2000). For an example of the influence of UNCITRAL
instruments in guiding national reforms, in the African context, see e.g., Marek Dubovec and
Cyprian Kambili, Secured Transactions Reform in Malawi – The 2013 Personal Property
Security Act in SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICE 391 (Louise Gullifer & Orkun Akseli eds., 2016) [hereinafter STLR: PRINCIPLES,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICE].
27. As an alternative to the blunt transposition of North American models, different
strategies have been utilized. In the European context, see generally Giuliano G. Castellano,
Reforming Non-Possessory Secured Transactions Laws: A New Strategy? 78 MOD. L. REV.
611 (2015) (indicating the reform of publicity rules, with the implementation of a filing system
to regulate priority represents a viable reform strategy to start more comprehensive reforms in
many European jurisdictions).
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e.g., Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. 28 In Belgium, a new law
inspired by international standards was recently adopted with the
intent of rationalizing the regime established by the civil code. 29 In
France, the work of the Grimaldi Commission led to a partial reform
of the civil and commercial codes and further amendments are
expected to align French secured transactions law with the
UNCITRAL Model Law. 30 Similarly, in Italy, a new non-possessory
pledge was introduced, albeit more comprehensive reforms are
demanded by many. 31 In the United Kingdom, secured transaction
law is not in line with international standards and reforms have been
debated for over five decades. 32 Although few statutory interventions
have been made, the wind of change seems to be blowing again and
new concrete proposals have been advanced for a more
comprehensive reform of English law. 33 In general, the number of
28. Katarína Mathernová, The Slovak Secured Transactions Reform: Ingredients of a
Successful Reform and Reflection on its Achievements, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS REFORM
AND ACCESS TO CREDIT 207 (Frederique Dahan & John Simpson eds., 2008).
29. Loi modifiant le Code Civil en ce qui concerne les sûretés réelles mobilières et
abrogeant diverses dispositions en cette matière [Act to Amend the Civil Code with Respect to
Security Rights and to Repeal Various Security Provisions] of July 11, 2013, MONITEUR
BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 2, 2013 [hereinafter Belgian Pledge Act].
The Act is not fully operational yet; for a comment, see Eric Dirix, The Belgian Reform on
Security Interests in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, supra note 26 at 391; Ivan
Peeters and Michiel de Muynck, Belgium Moves to Modernity but Only Half Way: The
Introduction of New Legislation on Security Interests in Movable Assets, 29 J. INT’L BANKING
& FIN. L. 75 (2014).
30. See Jean François Riffard, The Still Uncompleted Evolution of the French Law on
Secured Transactions towards Modernity, in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE,
supra note 26, at 369; Muriel Renaudin, The Modernisation of French Secured Credit Law:
Law as a Competitive Tool in Global Markets, 24 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 385
(2013).
31. Decreto Legge 30 giugno 2016, n. 119, G.U. Feb. 7, 2016, n. 153 (It.) [hereinafter
Italian Non-possessory Pledge Law]. For an early analysis on the reform debate in Italy, see
Guido Ferrarini, Changes to Personal Property Security Law in Italy: A Comparative and
Functional Approach, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROY GOODE
477 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997). For a more recent comment, see Anna Veneziano, Italian
Secured Transactions Law: the Need for Reform, in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 355.
32. The initiatives to reform English law may be traced back to the BOARD OF TRADE,
REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, 1962, Cmnd. 1749 (U.K.). A number of
subsequent proposals have followed. For a complete account, see HUGH BEALE ET AL., supra
note 2, ¶ 23.01ff.
33 . A more comprehensive reform is advocated by the Secured Transactions Law
Reform Project. See Secured Transactions Law Reform Project, Policy Paper,
SECUREDTRANSACTIONSLAWREFORMPROJECT.ORG (Apr. 2016), https://stlrp.files.wordpress.
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legal systems – within and outside the European Union – that have
adopted new laws, or are currently considering reforming their current
legal regime to establish proprietary entitlements in personal property,
is constantly growing.
To North American lawyers – who are acquainted with the
uniformity brought by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and
by the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts – the lack of a
harmonized, EU-wide legal framework for secured transactions might
appear peculiar. In the European Union, the effort to harmonize
national secured transactions laws has been confined within the
European Draft Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”), which in its
Book IX elicits the core principles for a pan-European secured
transactions law. 34 The DCFR, however, remains an academic
exercise, as it has not been incorporated into any domestic legislation
of EU Member States. Rather than providing a general legal
framework for secured credit, EU legislatures have followed different
avenues, harmonizing either rules pertaining to specific types of
collateral and secured transactions or provisions related to areas that
are contiguous to secured transactions law, and outside the scope of
this investigation, such as retention of title clauses in the context of
late payments and cross-border insolvency. 35 To the first category
belongs the Financial Collateral Directive (“FCD”) that establishes a
set of rules, implemented across the European Union, for transactions
secured with credit claims and financial collateral, i.e. cash and
financial instruments. 36 Although implemented to promote free
com/2016/05/str-general-policy-paper-april-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6N3H-M77R]
(archived Mar. 3, 2018). Moreover, the Financial Law Committee of the City of London Law
Society has been pressing for the implementation of a Secured Transactions Law Code. See
Richard Calnan, A Secured Transactions Code, 30 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 473 (2015).
34. PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2010) (2009)
[hereinafter DCFR]; See generally ULRICH DROBNIG & OLE BÖGER, PROPRIETARY SECURITY
IN MOVABLE ASSETS (2015).
35. For an overview and critique of the EU legislative efforts to offer a harmonized legal
framework for secured transactions, see Anna Veneziano, European Secured Transactions
Law at a Cross-Road, in ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT AND
COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HUGH BEALE 405ff (Louise Gullifer & Stefan
Vogenauer eds., 2014). On the EU cross-border insolvency regime, see generally Gerard
McCormack, Something Old, Something New: Recasting the European Insolvency Regulation,
79 MOD. L. REV. 121 (2016).
36. Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002
on Financial Collateral Arrangements as Regards Linked Systems and Credit Claims, 2002 O.J.
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movement of capital and financial stability within the European single
market, the FCD touches upon some of the core aspects of national
secured transactions laws. 37 Aside from some aspects concerning
financial collateral, in the EU, secured transactions are governed by
national laws. Court interpretations, doctrinaire constructions and
statutory provisions define the traits of a variety of consensual
instruments that secure the fulfillment of an obligation through an
entitlement over collateral in every European Union jurisdiction.
Charges, contractual liens and pledges are some of the fundamental
security instruments encountered in European legal systems to take
personal property as collateral.38 The list further expands when titlebased financing, such as financial leases and retention of title clauses,
are considered. 39 Hence, with few and limited exceptions, like
Belgium, 40 European legal systems have not attempted to adopt a
unitary, functionally-based approach and different legal categories
and security instruments often coexist at the national level.
1. The Rationale of Secured Transactions Law: Party Autonomy and
UNCITRAL Model Law
Absent an internationally harmonized secured transactions law,
its ethos is to be sought in the core areas that are common to any legal
framework regulating security rights over personal property. These
areas pertain to: (1) the creation of security rights over a wide range
of assets without dispossession of the debtor; (2) the priority status of
security rights against competing claims; (3) the enforcement of
security rights through judicial or extra-judicial mechanisms; and (4)

L. 168/43, as amended by Directive 2009/44/EC, 2009 O.J. L. 146/37 and by Directive
2014/59/EU, 2014 O.J. L. 173/190 [hereinafter FCD].
37. On the issues related to the implementation of the FCD, see e.g., Louise Gullifer,
What Should We Do About Financial Collateral?, 65 C.L.P. 377 (2012).
38 . See, e.g., Castellano, supra note 27, at 614-16 (noting that even if even if the
commercial use of these different security instruments is substantially similar, considerably
different legal rules apply, depending on the formal categorization of each and every
instrument).
39. On the variety of instruments belonging to this category, see 2 PHILIP R. WOOD,
COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND TITLE FINANCE ¶¶ 33-003ff (2007). On
leasing in US law, see Peter W. Schroth, Financial Leasing of Equipment in the Law of the
United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2010).
40. On the Belgian reform, see generally, supra note 29.
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the public disclosure of the potential existence of security rights. 41 In
general terms, promoting private negotiations is the primary rationale
of secured transactions law. Hence, party autonomy represents a
fundamental tenet that permeates, to a different extent, all these four
areas. Nonetheless, limits to contractual autonomy result from a
balance, underscoring various legal rules, among the interests of the
parties affected by the security instrument. The provisions elaborated
by UNCITRAL offer a privileged perspective to illustrate these points.
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions
(“UNCITRAL Model Law”) – adopted in July 2016 – epitomizes the
ongoing effort to assist national law reformers in “modernizing,” to
use UNCITRAL’s terminology, their secured transactions laws. 42 The
pivot of the UNCITRAL Model Law is the extensive deference to
party autonomy. Following a unitary, functionally-based approach,
any proprietary entitlement in personal property (movable assets)
“that is created by an agreement to secure payment or other
performance of an obligation” is considered a security right,
regardless of the denomination attributed to it by the parties. 43 This
41. These core elements emerge from various international standards. See Core
Principles for a Secured Transactions Law, EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV.,
http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395238854769&d=&pagename=EBRD%
2FContent%2FDownloadDocument (last visited Oct. 23, 2017); WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES
FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND CREDITOR/DEBTOR REGIMES (2016); UN COMM’N ON
INT’L TRADE (UNCITRAL) LEGISLATIVE GUIDE. ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2010). In the
literature, see John Armour, The Law and Economics Debate About Secured Lending: Lessons
for European Lawmaking? in THE FUTURE OF SECURED CREDIT IN EUROPE 14 (Horst
Eidenmüller & Eva Maria Kieninger eds., 2008).
42. UNCITRAL’S terminology differs from the one adopted by North American legal
systems. For instance, in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions, “security
interests” are referred to as “security rights,” “secured parties” as “secured creditors,”
“collateral” as “encumbered asset,” and “debtor” as “grantor.” MODEL LAW ON SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 102, 9 (UNCITRAL 2016) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW].
43 . UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 2(ii). The EUREuropean Bank for
Reconstruction & Dev., Model Law on Secured Transactions does not adopt a functional
approach. Instead, art. 6.1 recognizes three types of charges: a registered charge, an unpaid
vendor’s charge and a possessory charge. See MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 6.1
(EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV. 2004) [hereinafter EBRD MODEL LAW].
Likewise, the DCFR follows a functional approach, whilst distinguishing between “security
right in movable assets” and “retention of ownership devices.” DCFR supra note 35, ch. IX, §
1. In contrast, the Belgian Pledge Act, supra note 29, retained the traditional nomenclature of
security rights, including the terms and concepts of pledge (droit de gage/pandrecht), retention
of title (réserve de propriété/eigendomsvoorbehoud) and legal lien (droit de
rétention/retentierecht).
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means that consensual security instruments performing similar
economic functions are subjected to the same legal treatment and the
parties to a security agreement are not required to establish the correct
formal qualification of their transaction in order to determine the
relevant legal treatment. 44 Additionally, minimal requirements are
imposed to create a security right. For instance, a general description
of the encumbered assets is sufficient. 45 The principles of party
autonomy and minimal formalities influence different rules, such as
those governing perfection, i.e. effectiveness against third parties and
the enforcement of security rights. Parties are, thus, free to choose
either control or registration to perfect their security rights in financial
collateral. 46 In turn, registration, for any kind of collateral, follows a
notice-filing approach, whereby a standardized form requiring
skeletal information suffices to achieve perfection. 47 Therefore, the
registry represents a tool to promote private negotiations by
publicizing the potential existence of a security right and by generally
determining the priority following the first-to-file principle. 48 Party
autonomy is buttressed not solely by provisions affecting the secured
creditor-debtor relationship, it also extends to the relationship
between two secured creditors who might consensually alter their
order of priority, i.e. in a subordination agreement. 49 Hence, the
44. STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR., SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 84-85 (6th ed. 2015); ANTHONY J.
DUGGAN & JACOB S. ZIEGEL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY: CASES,
TEXT, AND MATERIALS 20-21 (6th ed. 2013). For an argument to extend the scope of
application beyond the functional equivalents to long-term leases and commercial
consignments, see Catherine Walsh, Transplanting Article 9: The Canadian PPSA Experience,
in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 49, 83-85.
45. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 6 & 9; See EBRD MODEL LAW,
supra note 43, art. 5.5.
46. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 26; DCFR, supra note 34, ch. IX,
§ 3:204. FCD states: “Member States shall not require that the creation, validity, perfection,
enforceability or admissibility in evidence of a financial collateral arrangement or the
provision of financial collateral under a financial collateral arrangement be dependent on the
performance of any formal act.” FCD, supra note 36, art. 3. In Belgium, a security right in
receivables may be perfected by control when the secured creditor notifies the receivables
obligor. See Belgian Pledge Act, supra note 29, art. 60.
47. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 18; DCFR, supra note 34, ch. IX,
§ 3:102(1).
48. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 19(2), 23 & 24; DCFR, supra note
34, ch. IX, § 4:101(2).
49. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 41; DCFR supra note 34, ch. IX, §
4:108(1).
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underlying rationale of the Model Law is that by establishing a
simplified set of rules that clearly defines the rights and obligations of
the parties entering into, or affected by, a secured transaction, private
negotiations are facilitated. In this regard, parties are free to satisfy
their idiosyncratic interests and risk appetites.
2. Beyond Party Autonomy: Balancing Conflicting Interests
National legal regimes may depart from the principles enshrined
in the UNCITRAL or EBRD model laws. Nonetheless, a common
operational logic may be isolated. The various rules regulating
creation, perfection, priority, and enforcement of security rights are
ultimately concerned with striking a balance among (often) antithetic
interests of three categories of affected parties, namely debtors,
secured creditors and competing claimants who may be buyers of the
collateral and creditors who have acquired an interest in the collateral
under a court decision. In addition, national bankruptcy laws insert
into the mix another category of competing claimants, i.e. preferential,
or statutory, claimants, which include employees for owed wages and
tax authorities. As different interests are balanced, party autonomy
results necessarily limited. The degree of this limitation varies across
legal systems.
In consideration of the historical and cultural contexts in which a
given rule developed, a greater level of protection to one of these
categories is granted. A few examples will illustrate this point. In
North American legal systems, the concept of “commercial
reasonableness” serves as a check against the great degree of freedom
accorded to secured creditors to determine the method and manner of
disposition of the collateral. 50 Under English common law, the core
distinction between floating and fixed charges has been developed by
courts precisely to balance different interests. 51 In fact, a charge is
characterized as floating if the debtor maintains control over the
collateral. However, in such a circumstance, the secured creditor
(charge holder) enjoys a lower priority status, as compared to the
holder of a fixed charge, and part of the charged assets must be
50. CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 3, at 29; HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 44,
at 638.
51. On the distinction between floating and fixed charges, among others, see GOODE,
supra note 3, at 136.
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apportioned to unsecured creditors. 52 Another example of this balance
is offered by the rules concerning the rights of buyers over
encumbered assets sold outside the ordinary course of business.
Pursuant to Article 26 of the Model Registry Provisions in the
UNCITRAL Model Law, a security right is not extinguished when the
encumbered asset is sold by the debtor outside the ordinary course of
business without the authorization of the secured creditor. However,
if further proprietary entitlements are created on the same asset,
striking the balance between different interests becomes more
problematic. If the buyer creates a security right in the purchased
asset in favor of another creditor, the buyer’s secured creditor would
encounter difficulties in ascertaining the existence of prior security
rights because searching the registry against the identifier of the buyer
would not disclose the encumbrance created by the seller of the
asset. 53 Hence, the rule that allows for a security right to continue
without an amendment of the registered notice that adds the buyer as
the new grantor after the collateral has been transferred favors the
first secured creditor over the transferee’s secured creditors. The logic
of this rule is that the transferee’s secured creditor should have
conducted due diligence beyond the registry record. However, the
desire to protect the secured creditors of the buyer, inter alia, has led
legislators to design a rule that imposes a duty on the secured creditor
of the seller to amend the registered notice within a period of time
after the sale of the asset. 54
Further limits to party autonomy emerge in different contexts.
For instance, civil codes belonging to the Romano-Germanic tradition
often limit secured creditors’ freedom to secure their loans with
excessive collateral. 55 Although common law systems typically allow
secured creditors to avail themselves of any remedies set forth in the

52. Insolvency Act, 1986 (as amended), c. 45, § 175 & 176A, sch. B1, ¶ 65(2) (Eng.)
[hereinafter Insolvency Act].
53. UNCITRAL, GUIDE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURITY RIGHTS REGISTRY
51-52 (2014) [hereinafter REGISTRY GUIDE].
54. See CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 3, at 263. Moreover, Walsh notes that
“…requiring the record to be updated only once actual knowledge is acquired would seem to
offer sufficient protection to subsequent secured creditors.” Walsh, supra note 44 at 75.
55. A practice known as overcollateralization. See Tajti, supra note 2, at 175; Brinkmann,
The Peculiar Approach of German Law in the Field of Secured Transactions and Why it has
Worked (So Far), in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 339, 346.
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security agreement, 56 in civilian traditions, enforcement rules and
procedures are often statutorily determined and may not be waived by
the parties. 57 Limitations to contractual freedom as a result of a
balancing exercise among different interests also emerge from the
discussion concerning the ability to create a security right in
receivables when a ban on assignments has been agreed upon by the
debtor and the obligor of the receivable, i.e. those who owe payment
on a receivable. When a ban on assignment is statutorily overridden,
the legal regime privileges – at the expense of the parties’ contractual
freedom – the interests of debtors, who may then assign receivables
irrespective of a restriction stipulated by the agreement that generated
such receivables. 58
In consideration of the variety of legal solutions stemming from
the rationale and the operational logic underscoring secured
transactions regimes, international soft-laws represent a consensus
among various, domestic legal doctrines and approaches. 59 Such a
consensus, achieved in United Nations’ boardrooms populated by
commercial law lawyers, is now tested against the requirements of
prudential regulation. In fact, whilst the rules pertaining to secured
transactions reflect a balance among the interests of different parties,
it remains to be ascertained whether a given rule favoring one of the
affected parties is to be preferred from a prudential regulatory
56. This is the case in English Law. See GOODE, supra note 3, ¶¶ 4-65. Contrast with
Part 6 of UCC Article 9 that “departs from the UCC’s general emphasis on freedom of
contract…contains a number of rules that cannot be waived or varied.” HARRIS & MOONEY,
supra note 44, at 578.
57. This is the case for Italy, where enforcement mechanisms are established by the law
and vary depending on the security instrument deployed. The new non-possessory pledge
allows secured creditors, if expressly established in the agreement, to retain possession of the
encumbered assets or dispose of them, provided that debtors are compensated for any profit
exceeding the secured value. See Italian Non-possessory Pledge Law, supra note 31, art. 1(6).
Moreover, DCFR ch. IX, § 7:101(2) requires that a security right is perfected before the
secured creditor may enforce it if third parties are involved. Furthermore, § 7:102 states that:
“As between the enforcing secured creditor and the security provider, the rules of this Chapter
are mandatory, unless otherwise provided.”
58. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 13. For the UK law, see Michael
Bridge, The Nature of Assignment and Non-assignment Clauses, 132 L. Q. R. 67 (2016),
noting that “the expected secondary legislation nullifying non-assignment clauses will restore
the marketability in the area of receivables financing.”
59. For an early contribution on the difficulties in reaching a consensus in this area, see
Ulrich Drobnig, Study on Security Interests, 8 UNCITRAL Y.B. 171, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/131
(1977) (and Annex).
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perspective. Addressing this core question will lead to a
reconsideration of well-established legal principles, such as those
defining the priority status of floating charges or the desirability of
bans on assignments. More profoundly, it emerges that informed
analyses of secured transactions law and its reform require taking into
account the regulatory dimension affecting the extension of credit
through the banking system.
B. Prudential Regulation: Crisis-driven International Standards
Prudential regulation, as it is the case for most regulatory
interventions, performs an ambivalent role by accommodating
conflicting interests with the objective of mitigating the risks
associated with activities otherwise beneficial for society, like the
extension of credit. Unlike other businesses however, banks are
highly leveraged, with low levels of equity, and thus particularly
exposed to the risk of default. 60 Within a fractional-reserve system,
banks hold only a portion of the capital raised and convert most of it
into means of production. 61 Long-term investments, like loans, are
60. This is an inner feature of the banking business. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra
note 4, at 51; CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 4, at 252; and JOHN ARMOUR ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 291 (noting that if banks were wholly funded by equity and in their balance
sheets only liquid assets were permitted, they would not be able to operate and extend credit to
the economy). As shown in detail in this Section, capital regulation is concerned precisely with
reducing banks’ leverage and ensuring sufficient liquidity of banks, by increasing the amount
of own funds.
61. Traditional accounts indicate that banks are intermediaries, implying that new loans
are created inasmuch as deposited savings are available. However, central bankers and leading
economists have indicated that deposits are created through loans. This is because every time a
loan is created a new deposit is also established. Given that deposits represent purchasing
power, commercial banks in essence create money, broadly conceived. See, e.g., Michael
McLeay et al., Money creation in the modern economy (BANK OF ENG, Quarterly Bulletin
2014. Q. BULL. 2014); Todd Keister & James J. McAndrews, Why Are Banks Holding So
Many Excess Reserves? Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 380, (2009).
The limits to deposit creation (through loans) relates to market pressures and monetary policy
constraints. See James Tobin, Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money” (Cowles
Foundation for Research in Economics, Discussion Paper No. 159, 1963) (indicating reserves
as one of the limits to the creation of loans). In legal scholarship the point has been noted by
several commentators pointing at profound implications for financial regulation. See Robert
Hockett & Saule Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017)
(describing the banking system as a public-private partnership in which public actors
accommodate and monetize private liabilities); MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM:
RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016) (defining the relationship between banking,
financial instability, and private money creation as the “money problem”); and Dan Awrey,
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thus funded largely by short-term liabilities, like deposits. 62 As a
result of this maturity mismatch in the balance sheets, banks are
required to manage a variety of risks, most importantly, credit risk, i.e.
the risk of borrowers not repaying their long-term obligations, 63 and
liquidity risk, i.e. the risk of not having sufficient cash to meet shortterm obligations. 64 Moreover, given the inner complexities
characterizing modern banking activities, banks are increasingly more
exposed to operational risk that is represented by the potential loss
resulting from failures in internal processes and systems (including
those deployed to manage the aforementioned risks) or from external
events. 65 Failures in the management of those risks may, depending
on various factors, result in the default of individual banks with
negative implications for depositors, other creditors and for the “real
economy,” i.e. the part of the economic system concerned with the
production and the trade of goods and services. Similarly, economic
or financial turmoil may distress individual banks, generating an
adverse feedback loop, whereby a diffused accruement of credit risk
and a decline in available liquidity, due, for instance, to a contagion
effect, hinder banks’ ability to manage risk and in turn exacerbate
economic downturns. 66 In his seminal work, Hyman Minsky
Brother, Can You Spare a Dollar? Designing an Effective Framework for Foreign Currency
Liquidity Assistance COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 934 (2017) (noting that, in the context of the
Eurodollar market, the ability of financial institutions to create currency liabilities impacts on
the ability of central banks to provide assistance in case of liquidity shortage).
62. Even if banks do not lend out deposits, but they create credit, deposits can still be
used to fund loans. Simply, the amount of savings held by a bank does not represent per se a
limit to the banks’ ability of creating loans. For a discussion on this point and its implications
on capital regulation, see Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and
Regulatory Incentives, supra note 6.
63. Credit risk is defined as the risk that borrowers may not meet their obligations and
relates to non-trading activities. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF CREDIT RISK 1 (2000).
64. For an overview of the different connotations of liquidity in the banking system, see
Kleopatra Nikolaou, Liquidity (Risk) Concepts: Definitions and Interactions (Eur. Cent. Bank,
Working Paper No. 1008, 2009).
65. See BASEL III, supra note 13, at 128.
66. The literature on bank crises is vast. Contagion is generally indented as a herd
behavior, whereby investors (or depositors) simultaneously withdraw funds from financial
institutions, regardless of whether those institutions are in distress. Thus, bank failures are not
contingent on insolvency. Contagion is, in fact, a liquidity crisis, inherent to the financial
institutions financed through short-term borrowing. See generally HAL S. SCOTT,
CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS
(2016) (highlighting that contagion has been the most destructive phenomenon in financial
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advanced the idea that financial instability is a cyclical phenomenon
that escalates through different phases fueled by an uncontrolled
accumulation of debt that may become excessive and eventually
cannot be repaid. 67 Thus, the effective management of credit risk and
maintenance of sufficient liquidity are essential for both the proper
functioning of banks and the stability of the financial and economic
systems.
The core mechanism to manage those risks is represented by
banks’ own funds that are traditionally divided into economic capital,
determined by banks, and regulatory capital, prescribed by
regulators. 68 While banks have developed sophisticated techniques to
calculate economic capital, the limited liability structure, together
with corporate governance and compensation mechanisms, may
incentivize managers to hold less capital. 69 Given that own funds are
more expensive than borrowed funds, 70 management is incentivized
markets and played a critical role in the 2008 financial crisis). For the economic literature on
the interplay between financial stability, liquidity and credit risk, see generally Douglas W.
Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises, 60 J. FIN. 615
(2005).
67. See generally HYMAN P. MINSKY, CAN “IT” HAPPEN AGAIN? ESSAYS ON
INSTABILITY AND FINANCE (2015) (1982). Similar considerations have been advanced by
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
CRISES (1978).
68. The distinction is ubiquitous in financial economics. See generally George G.
Kaufman, Capital in Banking: Past, Present and Future, 5 J. FIN. SERV.. RES. 385 (1992). See
FRANS DE WEERT, BANK AND INSURANCE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 21 (2011); PIETER
KLAASSEN & IDZARD VAN EEGHEN, ECONOMIC CAPITAL: HOW IT WORKS AND WHAT EVERY
MANAGER NEEDS TO KNOW 2 (2009).
69. See INTERIM REPORT TO THE G7 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK
GOVERNORS (Financial Stability Forum 2008). For lucid analysis of the relationship between
bank’s corporate governance and financial stability, see Emilios Avgouleas & Jay Cullen,
Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and Financial Stability Costs of a
Symbiotic Relationship, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2015). For a behavioral approach explaining
the incentives to acquire excessive risk, see Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis,
Behavioural Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L.
STUD. 23 (2009).
70. The Modigliani-Miller theorem on corporate finance posits that the value of a firm is
not affected by its capital structure. Hence, whether a firm deploys primary equity or debt does
impact, or has a minimal impact, on the cost of financing. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H.
Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON.
REV. 261, 265-81 (1958). However, it is commonly recognized that for banks debt is less
expensive than equity, due to lower taxes attached to debt instruments and because deposits
are protected by, implicit or explicit, public guarantees. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 5, at
310-311; ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 110-11.
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to decrease the level of protection and instead engage in investments
that maximize shareholders’ value and returns in the short term. This
may result in excessive risk-taking, insufficient liquidity, and,
ultimately, undercapitalization. It is precisely in an effort to address
these issues that further mandatory requirements impose on banks an
additional layer of capital, known as “regulatory capital.” 71
Historically, regulatory capital – mirroring the role of economic
capital – has been devised to perform a micro-prudential function;
namely, to decrease the odds of an individual bank’s failure, both by
strengthening its ability to absorb unexpected losses and by
preventing excessive risk-taking. 72 As demonstrated by the treatise of
the recent developments in international capital requirements,
prudential regulation has been increasingly geared to address the
overall stability of the banking system. 73 Hence, the resulting
regulatory framework is aimed at ensuring the soundness of
individual banks (micro-prudential regulation) and the entire banking
system (macro-prudential regulation) by controlling the amount of
funds that banks can convert into investments.
The preventive rationale of prudential regulation is reflected in
the provisions establishing minimum capital requirements. In general
terms, a bank’s regulatory capital should be, at any point in time,
equal to (or greater than) a minimum level that is set through a fixed
percentage of the bank’s overall economic resources, including loans
and other investments. Because the value and the exposure associated
with banks’ investments are floating, the amount and the composition
of regulatory capital vary widely over time. For each and every
lending operation, banks should calculate a capital charge, which is a
percentage of the total amount of regulatory capital and is determined
71 . See Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory
Incentives, supra note 6, at n.60 and accompanying text, indicating that given that banks are
considered to create credit, capital regulation represents a tool to control the creation of credit
(and thus of debt) in the economy.
72. On the distinction between micro-prudential and macro-prudential regulation, see
infra note 106 and related treatise in the text. In general terms, the role of capital requirements
is ascribed to the preventive function of prudential regulation, whereby rules are established to
ensure the soundness of financial institutions. See ROSS CRANSTON, EMILIOS AVGOULEAS,
KRISTIN VAN ZWIETEN, CHRISTOPHER HARE & THEODOR VAN SANTE, PRINCIPLES OF
BANKING LAW 31 (3d ed. 2018) (noting, inter alia, that prudential regulation comprises the
rules “to keep financial institutions safe and as a going concern”).
73. See id and infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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in proportion to the level of risk, i.e. exposure, posed by that
operation. 74 The basic formula to compute capital charges thus
multiplies the regulatory capital percentage by the risk-weighted
coefficient that is determined for any given lending operation. The
operational logic characterizing this process may be defined as riskbased. This means that capital requirements are crafted to ensure that
higher risk exposures result in higher risk-weighted coefficients and
thus higher capital charges. It follows that, differently from what has
been noted for secured transactions law, in prudential regulation, the
level of risk taken by banks is a matter of law and is governed through
the statutory provisions prescribed by capital requirements.
1. International Capital Requirements: Evolution and Current
Approach
Following a series of bank failures in the 1970s, the Basel
Committee was tasked with the drafting of harmonized standards
ensuring capital adequacy of internationally active banks. 75 The
centerpiece of this effort is reflected in the Basel Capital Accords,
representing an internationally coordinated set of administrative rules.
Even though the Accords, like the UNCITRAL Model Law, are not
legally binding under international law, they have been implemented
as binding rules in most jurisdictions. 76 Since the First Basel Accord
(“Basel I”), adopted in 1988, the definition of minimum capital
requirements has followed a tortuous path of multiple refinements,
political compromises and critiques.77 Basel I – through a relatively
straightforward methodology – achieved the primary objective of
74. For a discussion on the basic principles applicable to computing regulatory capital,
see DE WEERT, supra note 68, at 75; Gordy, Heitfield & Wu, supra note 5, at 552.
75. In particular, the Basel Committee was established in response to the failure and
liquidation of the Herstatt Bank in 1974. The Herstatt Bank was liquidated by German
authorities before it could satisfy its obligations owed to American counterparties. Its collapse
was followed in the same year by the failure of the Franklin National Bank in New York, with
ripple effects on international financial markets. See BRUMMER, supra note 9, at 99;
GOODHART, supra note 9, at 31-35.
76. For a progress report on the implementation of the Basel framework, see BASEL
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
BASEL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs247.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z48V-B5YB] (archived Mar. 3, 2018).
77. For a critical appraisal of BASEL II and its development, see generally DANIEL K.
TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION
(2008).
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imposing a minimum threshold for regulatory capital (at eight
percent). However, discrepancies in national implementations and the
lack of sufficient risk-sensitivity to compute capital charges
ultimately undermined its effectiveness – particularly with respect to
maintaining consistency across jurisdictions – and led to its revision
and replacement with the adoption of Basel II. 78
Basel II, initially published in 2004 and further revised in 2006,
introduced a three-pillar structure. 79 The first pillar defined new
capital requirements, refining and expanding the risk-weighted
method with the inclusion of new and adjusted parameters for various
risk-exposures and a menu of three methodologies that banks could
employ to determine their regulatory capital. Under the basic
methodology, drawn from Basel I and referred to as “standardized
approach,” Basel II has statutorily prescribed the risk-weight
parameters to calculate capital charges in accordance to the riskiness
of various operations. 80 With the introduction of two additional
Internal Rating-Based (“IRB”) methodologies, 81 banks have been
allowed, upon regulatory approval, to adopt their own models to
adjust the risk-weighted coefficients and ultimately benefit from
lower capital charges. In other words, in an attempt to alleviate the
costs of compliance and monitoring, the introduction of IRB
methodologies has elevated the models used by the industry for the
calculation of economic capital to legal standards for the computation
of regulatory capital. 82
The use of internal models to determine regulatory capital was a
novelty in banking regulation. Today, it represents a rather
established regulatory technique adopted not only in financial
regulation, known in the literature as “meta-regulation” or “enforced
78. Id at 122.
79. See BASEL II, supra note 12, at 6. Although in the European Union every bank
operating in the single market was subjected to Basel II, in the United States, small banks were
exempted and have been regulated under Basel I. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 605.
80. For a comparison of the different risk-weightings set forth by Basel I and Basel II,
see SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 588-92 and 596-601; see also Kern Alexander, The
Role of Capital in Supporting Financial Stability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION 344 (Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015).
81. The two methodologies are the Foundation Internal Rating-Based (F-IRB) and the
Advanced Internal Rating-Based (A-IRB). The latter allows banks to determine most of the
parameters of the formula to calculate capital charges.
82. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD:
AN EXPLANATORY NOTE (2001) [hereinafter AN EXPLANATORY NOTE].
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self-regulation.” 83 Regulators, instead of prescribing how regulated
entities should comply with regulatory principles, require regulated
entities to, first, develop their own mechanisms for compliance and,
second, to prove the effectiveness of such mechanisms to regulators.
In the context of capital regulation, the reason for involving regulated
institutions in the regulatory process is twofold. First, there is an
inherent benefit in building upon the knowledge and the expertise of
the banking industry, given that regulators necessarily rely on
practices developed by regulated entities to devise effective
regulatory action. Thus, rather than imposing prescriptive rules that
may be inflexible, the possibility of developing internal models to
meet capital requirements aims at increasing the responsibility of
regulated banks by incentivizing them to develop processes that both
fit within their internal organizational structures and ensure regulatory
compliance. Second, the expected lower capital charges resulting
from the adoption of their own models and estimations – provided
that they are approved by regulators – should incentivize banks to
strengthen their risk management practices, resulting in greater
resilience.84

83. Self-enforced regulation has been approached as a technique that transcends the
traditional dichotomy between self-regulation and prescriptive regulatory standards and has
been defined as a form of “subcontracting regulatory functions to private actors.” IAN AYRES
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION
DEBATE 103 (1992). The sectors where meta regulatory approaches have been adopted for
some time are many and include food and industrial safety as well and environmental
protection and pollution control. See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, ManagementBased Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003). For a critical assessment of meta-regulation in the context of
international financial regulation, see Julia Black, Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’
Techniques and the Financial Crisis, 75 MOD. L. REV. 1037, 1045 (2012) (also noting that the
arguments in support of meta-regulation are grounded on the idea that it enables firms to
embed compliance mechanisms within their organisational structure, placing on them the
responsibility to demonstrate compliance, rather than requiring regulators to demonstrate lack
of compliance). In general, also after the recent financial crises, meta-regulatory techniques are
widely used to define the system of corporate governance and control of banks. See generally
IRIS HY CHIU, REGULATING (FROM) THE INSIDE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL
CONTROL IN BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2015).
84 . See AN EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 82. Professor Black noted that metaregulation relies on regulated institutions having an appropriate culture of compliance and a
correct set of incentives to pursue simultaneously public interest and private objectives. In a
similar vein, regulatory authorities should have adequate skills to assess firms as well as
“sufficient courage and political support to challenge them.” See Black supra note 83, at 1046.
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The introduction of Basel II was controversial and, as the 20072008 crisis unfolded, the Accord proved to harbor deep conceptual
and operational flaws. A series of issues also emerged with respect to
the reliance on internal models to calculate regulatory capital.
Although large banks welcomed with favor the introduction of the
internal model approach, the financial crisis revealed a series of
weaknesses. First, there was the suspicion that banks could
manipulate the IRB variants to benefit from lower charges without
effectively curbing risks. 85 Second, the quality of internal data
appeared questionable, given that the limited timeframe considered
was inadequate to reflect systemic shocks which, by construction,
were considered extremely unlikely. 86 Third, the adoption of the IRB
methodologies was not homogenous and similar operations
corresponded to very different risk assessments and, thus, capital
requirements. Finally, only largest banks fully benefited from capital
reliefs associated with adoption of the most sophisticated IRB variant,
i.e. the Advanced IRB, to calculate risk-weights for corporate
exposures. 87 Instead, for corporate lending, banks tend to rely on
parameters and models offered by regulators. These observations are
not surprising: time is required to gather reliable datasets, develop
stochastic analyses as well as to implement and fine-tune new
governance approaches that have been re-defining the relationship
between regulatory authorities and regulated entities. 88
To address (at least partially) the concerns with Basel II, the
Basel Committee initiated a process of reforms that, following
85. Alexander, supra note 80, at 346.
86. SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 601 (indicating also the IRB approaches are not
tailored to reflect the differences in national laws). More generally financial economists have
noted that the models prescribed by Basel II are flawed. Jon Danielsson, Blame the Models, 4 J.
FIN. STABILITY 321, 326 (2008) (noting that the focus on small and frequent events to
construct models to calculate capital charges leads to unrealistic assumptions over the
likelihood and the impact of larger losses).
87. Given the ability of IRBs to significantly reduce capital charges, their adoption is
expected to increase in the European Union. See EUR. BANKING AUTH. (EBA), INTERIM
RESULTS UPDATE OF THE EBA REVIEW OF THE CONSISTENCY OF RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS
(2013). Whereas, in the United States, the adoption of IRB approaches is considered less
permissive. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 606.
88. On the benefits and limits of internal models, see Robert F. Weber, New Governance,
Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models
Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, ADMINISTRATIVE L.R. 783, 860 (2010) (noting
that for regulators the use of internal models is a tool to bridge the information asymmetry
between banks and regulators).
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extensive negotiations, resulted in the adoption of Basel III. 89 The
necessity of a new accord to replace Basel II became evident with the
2007-2009 financial crisis. Nonetheless, the adoption of Basel III
occurred into two phases. Hence, certain elements of Basel III,
primarily concerned with the level and the quality of regulatory
capital, were adopted in 2011 and implemented starting from January
2013. The remaining elements were adopted in 2017, and they will
progressively enter into force starting from 2022 with a full
implementation scheduled in 2027.90 It follows that the dawn is still
not an imminent event for Basel II. Moreover, Basel II, together with
the changes introduced in 2011, constitutes the Basel framework that
is currently in force in several jurisdictions, including across the
European Union.91
The long gestation required to finalize Basel III and the
prolonged implementation period signal the existence of contraposed
interests. Notably, these were represented, on the one hand, by the
necessity of limiting the use of internal models and, on the other hand,
by the compliance costs that sudden limitations to the use of internal
models would have had on banks relying on them. 92 Hence, different
approaches have been developed, first, at the national level and, then,
at the international level with the final adoption of Basel III.
Limitations to the use of internal models have been, at first,
introduced at the national level. In particular, the powers of national
regulators to challenge the statistical models proposed by banks have
been strengthened and regulators may impose more stringent criteria
to ensure the reliability of banks’ own estimations. Further limitations
89. See supra note 13.
90. See supra notes 13 & 23 and accompanying texts.
91 . Moreover, BASEL II is poised to be relevant for several years to come. The
implementation of the new Accord is likely to occur first in developed economies, whereas the
timing for phasing out Basel II – and Basel I – in the rest of the world remains uncertain.
92. See supra note 23. Considering that in the European Union every bank is subject to
the Basel Accords and that the adoption of IRB approaches is common among large European
banks, authorities from EU Member States were reluctant to accept limitations to the use of
internal models put forward by Basel III. Such limitations, in fact, are likely to result in an
increase of regulatory capital for European banks. Differently, in the United States, limitations
to the use of IRB approaches for large banks are already in place and small banks still rely on a
version of Basel I to compute capital requirements. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at
605. Through these lenses, it is possible to understand that the stall in the negotiations
concerning the completion of BASEL III (see supra note 15) was resolved also through the
concession of a long implementation period.
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are evident in the parameters adopted by national authorities to
calculate capital charges for loans secured with real property. For
instance, the Bank of England proposed more stringent parameters to
calculate the risk-weight of residential mortgages under the IRB
methodologies. 93 Such a trend reflects shared regulatory concerns
over the dynamics leading to the 2007-2009 global financial crisis,
originated in the mortgage market. More generally, the use of internal
models has been typically limited through two techniques. The first
one consists in the establishment of floors, below which the IRB
approaches cannot reduce capital charges. 94 As a result, the use of
own estimations is constrained within parameters that are statutorily
established for different operations. The second technique commonly
used is termed “slotting” and consists of classifying financing
operations into buckets, or slots, with varying risk weights. 95
Depending on a series of mandatory criteria, banks are required to
categorize each operation within a corresponding slot in order to
calculate capital charges. Both techniques are featured in the final
version of Basel III. 96
Although Basel III is built upon the structure introduced by
Basel II, thus maintaining the three-pillar structure and the possibility
to use internal models, the new Accord introduces a number of
significant changes. Since its inception, Basel III has been
characterized by a pronounced emphasis on the overall stability of the
banking system with attention towards the interconnectedness of
banks, the levels of liquidity and leverage, as well as the quality of
93. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., BANK OF ENG., CONSULTATION PAPER:
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE RISK WEIGHTS 5 (2016), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/consultation-paper/2016/cp2916.pdf?la=en&hash=6EA
CFA5B459ECB1FB8D06991F4C18E0DE66F33D4 [https://perma.cc/WH9Q-Y84P] (archived
Mar. 3, 2018). A similar approach has been followed by the Swedish Banking Supervisor
(Finansinspektionen) in a memorandum expressly referred to the inability of internal risk
models to capture (adequately) the risk related to mortgages, posing concerns for the stability
of the Swedish market. See FIN. SUPERVISORY AUTH. (Finansinspektionen), MEMORANDUM:
RISK WEIGHT FLOOR FOR SWEDISH MORTGAGES 1 (2013), http://www.fi.se/contentassets/
f1de28204ca048d1a780ca4d230fae1d/riskviktsgolv-svenska-bolan-12-11920-21maj2014eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5H4-Z3LM] (archived Mar. 3, 2018).
94. See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 5, at 304.
95. See IRB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, at 2.
96. For instance, see BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 38 (requiring banks that do not meet
certain criteria to categorize their internal risk grades into five supervisory slots which specific
risk weights). See also BASEL III, supra note 13, e.g., ¶ 147 (establishing a general twenty
percent floor for collateralized transactions).
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regulatory capital to limit excessive risk-taking. 97 With its finalization,
the risk-sensitivity of the standardized approach to calculate credit
risk and operational risk has been improved with the introduction of
more uniform criteria and further granularity among classes of
borrowers and categories of operations. 98 Moreover, the risk-weighted
capital ratio has been accompanied by a reinforced leverage ratio,
sustained by new capital floors applicable regardless of the
methodology adopted. 99 These revisions have the practical effect of
bringing the standardized and the IRB approaches closer to one
another. The intent is, in fact, twofold and consists of increasing the
flexibility in the calculation of capital charges while limiting
methodological discrepancies across jurisdictions and among banks.
Notwithstanding the amplitude and the depth of these changes,
when it comes to personal property collateral, Basel III does not
present any significant variations from the general framework
established in Basel II. If anything, the stronger emphasis on liquidity
that permeates Basel III reinforces the regulatory skepticism, further
illustrated below, 100 towards any collateral that is considered not
sufficiently liquid and prone to depreciation in case of economic
97. This is evident already from the changes introduced in 2011. See
SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 608-609; and Alexander, supra note 76, at 349. For a
summary of the main changes introduced by Basel III, see BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY OF BASEL III REFORMS (2017) https://www.bis.org
/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5KH-KYL2] (archived Mar. 3, 2018)
[hereinafter BASEL III HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY].
98. For instance, the standardized approach of Basel II assigned a flat risk weight that
was equal for every residential mortgage. Under the standardized approach put forward in
Basel III, the risk-weightings for mortgages depend on the loan-to-value ratio of the mortgage,
that is the amount of the loan divided by the value of the property; see BASEL III, supra note
13 ¶ 62. Moreover, a new risk-weighting has been introduced for exposures to small and
medium-sized enterprises, BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 43. In regard to operational risk, higher
capital requirements apply to larger banks, as it is assumed that operational risk increases with
a bank’s income, and to banks that have experienced greater losses due to operational failures,
as they are considered more likely to suffer similar losses in the future. See BASEL III HIGHLEVEL SUMMARY supra note 97, 8.
99. The refined leverage ratio targets, in particular, systemically important banks that
would have to ensure at any point in time a minimum level of equity, in addition to the riskweighted capital ratio; see BASEL III, supra note 13, 140. In respect to the new output floor see
BASEL III HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY supra note 97, 11.
100. In this Article reference to BASEL III is made only where relevant for comparative
purposes, given that Basel II is still the current set of standards for capital requirements and
that Basel III did not modify substantially the regime governing the treatment of personal
property as collateral.
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downturns. EU regulators and Member State authorities, following
this trend, have substantially conformed to the Basel framework
without prescribing any variation for the risk-weight parameters for
transactions secured with personal property. 101
2. The Rationale for Capital Requirements: Regulating Risk
Given that the Basel framework is crisis-driven, its rationale
should be interpreted in the light of the core concerns that emerged
from the global financial crisis, whereby banks – notwithstanding
formal compliance with capital standards – experienced liquidity
issues. 102 The risk of a collapse of the entire financial system, together
with multiple regulatory failures in addressing that occurrence,
prompted national and international regulators to take a broader look
at the dynamics of financial markets and to reassess the appropriate
regulatory strategies to preserve financial stability. 103 In banking
regulation, the stance for more direct action to curb the risk of a
systemic failure entails a more careful balance between the traditional
micro-prudential focus, inherent in the Basel Accords, and macroprudential regulatory tools, aimed at ensuring the stability of the
banking system as a whole. 104 An effective illustration of the
difference between these two regulatory functions is offered by a
recurring metaphor according to which micro-prudential regulation is
101. With regard to the United Kingdom, regardless of terms defining its departure from
the European Union, there is no indication that national regulators will not apply the provision
enshrined in EU law, at least in the context of the risk-weight approach for loans secured
through movable assets. In general, a disapplication of EU regulation may have direct
consequences on the ability of British banking institutions to operate in the single market. For
an analysis of the impact of various “Brexit” options on the financial service industry in the
United Kingdom, see John Armour, Brexit and Financial Services 33 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POLICY S54 (2017). See also Niamh Moloney, Financial Services, the EU, and Brexit: An
Uncertain Future for The City? 17 GERMAN L.J. 75 (2016).
102. BASEL III (2011), supra note 13, ¶ 35.
103. See generally FIN. SERVICES AUTH. (FSA), THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009); EU COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE HIGH
LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU CHAIRED BY JACQUES DE LAROISIERE
(2009). On the failures of various regulatory strategies, including those incentivizing the use of
internal models, see Black, supra note 83, at 1037.
104. Several assessments have been made to identify critical regulatory failures that
emerged during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. For an elevated perspective on the regulatory
governance issues, see Black supra note 83. For a political economy perspective, see WHAT
HAVE WE LEARNED? MACROECONOMIC POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS (George Akerlof et al.
eds., 2014).
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concerned with the health of the trees (individual banks) and macroprudential regulation is the safeguard of the forest (the banking
system as a whole). 105
In practical terms, micro and macro-prudential regulatory
strategies may differ significantly. The former focuses primarily on
“idiosyncratic risk,” which is the risk related to any specific operation.
Given that idiosyncratic risks are, by definition, uncorrelated with one
another and show little correlation with market risk, under a microprudential approach capital requirements curb individual riskexposures chiefly through diversification strategies. In contrast, under
a macro-prudential approach, capital requirements are designed to
address more directly the correlation among various risk-exposures.
In particular, they are concerned with the mitigation of “systemic risk,”
which is the likelihood that an event affecting one or more financial
entities triggers financial instability. 106 The cyclical movements of
markets and economies, the occurrence of diffused shocks and the
failure of interconnected banks undermine risk-management strategies
based on diversification. For instance, granting credit to a small
105. Rosa Maria Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability, 6 CAPITAL
MARKETS L.J. 197, 198 (2011) (focusing on the need for a special regime to resolve
systemically relevant financial institutions, of SIFIs). For an early analysis indicating the
necessity of combining micro-prudential and macro-prudential regulatory tools, see Andrew D.
Crockett, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements, Remarks at the Eleventh
International Conference of Banking Supervisors: Marrying the Micro- and Macro-prudential
Dimensions of Financial Stability (Basel, Sept. 20-21, 2000).
106. Systemic risk is a multifaceted concept that, like its positive counterpart “financial
stability,” has blurred contours. A joint report issued by the International Monetary Fund, the
Bank for International Settlements, and the Financial Stability Board sets a commonly
accepted definition indicating a systemic event as “the disruption to the flow of financial
services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system; and (ii) has
the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy.” INT’L MONETARY
FUND ET AL., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS–BACKGROUND
PAPER 5-6 (2009). Professor Steven Schwarcz indicated that systemic risk should be
understood as a specific type of tragedy of the commons that occurs because market
participants are not incentivized to limit individual risk-taking, notwithstanding the potential
negative consequences on markets. Therefore, regulatory intervention is necessary and should
be tailored to redress the incentive structure of financial institutions. See Steven L. Schwarcz,
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO L.J. 193 (2008). For an account of the primary issues related to
systemic risk in the banking sector, see Olivier de Bandt et al., Philipp Hartmann & José L.
Peydró, Systemic Risk in Banking After the Great Financial Crisis, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BANKING (Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux & John O.S. Wilson eds., 2014).
On regulating systemic risk in capital markets, see Anita I. Anand, Is Systemic Risk Relevant to
Securities Regulation, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 941 (2010).
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business is a routine financing operation that presents a high level of
idiosyncratic risk and a low level of systemic risk. The related credit
risk is mitigated in a portfolio containing other (less risky) loans; thus
the probability of non-repayment is higher than the probability that a
default on that loan could generate a systemic shock. Yet, a phase of
economic recession that simultaneously constrains the ability of a
large portion of small businesses to repay their loans when due would
impair the ability of the lender to meet its short-term obligations.
Depending on the economic contingencies, a lack of sufficient
liquidity may then ramify into systemic concerns. This sketch
illustrates that the mitigation of credit risk may not alone curb the risk
of banking or systemic failures. Given the maturity mismatch between
short-term liabilities and long-term investments, a bank may become
insolvent due to insufficient liquidity. Hence, the Basel framework is
particularly concerned with the maintenance of sufficient levels of
liquidity of individual banks as well as within the entire banking
system.
The pivot of the risk-based approach of the Basel framework is
represented by the coefficients to weigh capital charges against the
levels of risks, in particular credit risk, associated with lending
operations. Under the standardized approach, risk-weighted
coefficients are defined by regulators and the possibility of
considering factors mitigating credit risk is limited. For instance,
small business loans are risk-weighted at seventy-five percent,107 and
only security rights over highly liquid assets, such as bank accounts,
may be considered to reduce credit risk and thus capital charges.
Risk-weight coefficients feed into the capital adequacy formula and,
assuming there are no other risk factors or surcharges, capital charges
are calculated by multiplying: (1) the loaned amount, by (2) the riskweight, by (3) eight percent. By way of example, a small business
loan with a value of 100 requires a bank to hold capital equal to or
greater than six.
Risk-weighted coefficients can be considered legal constructions
that resemble statutory presumptions expressed in percentage terms of
107. BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 69. Basel III has introduced a new risk weight for
exposures to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Hence, when the new rules will
enter into force, exposures to SMEs could either be subject to a treatment similar to the one
currently in place, thus receiving a risk weight of seventy-five percent or, if not eligible, they
could still receive a eighty-five percent risk-weighting.
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both the likelihood of repayment and the level of liquidity for
different classes of financing operations and borrowers. The adoption
of the IRB variants allows banks to adjust such a presumption. Under
the IRBs, banks may determine the parameters for the calculation of
capital charges by resorting to internal estimations over the
probability of default and the resulting losses. The risks associated
with a specific lending operation may be further mitigated, taking into
account specific factors, such as the protection offered by a security
right over tangible assets or receivables. However, in spite of their
name, IRBs are governed by stringent regulatory prescriptions,
according to which a security right in collateral may lead to reduced
capital charges only if banks comply with specific regulatory
requirements, as further examined in the next Section of this Article.
Even more, as illustrated earlier, the finalization of Basel III has
further constrained the use of IRBs. 108
From the above it emerges that the tension between secured
transactions law and prudential regulation has profound roots.
Secured transactions law aims at facilitating credit creation through
private negotiations and under the assumption that credit risk is
mitigated whenever security rights over collateral are taken. In this
regard, secured transactions law, by focusing on the transactional
dimension of security rights, is not concerned with systemic
considerations nor does it delve into the connection between credit
and liquidity risk. Prudential regulation is a crisis-driven,
internationally-led regulatory framework designed to prevent banking
failures and preserve the stability of the entire financial system.
Stemming from this general rationale, capital requirements follow an
operational logic that regulates banks from “within” in order to limit
the level of risk taken by a particular bank as well as the risk
accumulated in the entire banking system. Upon these premises,
dissonances are expected when the rules governing security rights
encounter the legal presumptions and the regulatory parameters
established to compute capital charges; that is when the secured
creditor is a regulated credit institution.

108. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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III. DISSONANCES BETWEEN SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW
AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
While any security instrument can be understood as a device to
manage credit risk, 109 different rules on creation, perfection, priority,
and enforcement impact the credit protection effectively offered by
each instrument. The legal treatment of a security right depends on
either its legal nature, under legal regimes embracing a formalist
approach, such as English law, 110 or its economic effects, under legal
regimes that follow functionalism as the ordering principle, including
those defined by UNCITRAL reflecting the North American
experience. 111 In legal systems deploying formalism, in which
multiple categories of security rights coexist, the legal
characterization of a security instrument is to be ascertained in order
to determine the requirements for its creation, perfection, priority, and
enforcement. By and large, the prudential regulatory framework
neglects the granularity of national laws, focusing instead on specific
legal and economic effects of a security right. Security instruments,
together with other contractual mechanisms, are defined as CreditRisk Mitigation (“CRM”) techniques. 112 CRMs are primarily
designed to lessen the risks associated with individual financing
operations and, overall, with the entire portfolio of financing
operations of a bank. When CRM techniques are employed, the
resulting risk-weighted capital charge should not be higher than that
imposed on otherwise identical transactions that are not covered by
credit protections. 113 However, if providing inadequate credit
109. Castellano, supra note 27, at 617 (indicating that “the primary economic function of
non-possessory secured transactions is to manage and mitigate credit risk without limiting the
production capacity of the collateral and the debtor.”).
110. A formalist approach is adopted in various European jurisdictions e.g., France and
Italy, where multiple categories of security rights coexist and are statutorily defined. On the
formalist approach, see GOODE, supra note 3, ¶ 1-04.
111. For a critical assessment of functionalism and formalism in secured transactions
laws, see Michael G. Bridge et al., Formalism, Functionalism, and Understanding the Law of
Secured Transactions, 44 MCGILL L.J. 567 (1999).
112. CRMs are defined as techniques whereby “exposures may be collateralized by first
priority claims, in whole or in part with cash or securities, a loan exposure may be guaranteed
by a third party, or a bank may buy a credit derivative to offset various forms of credit risk.”
BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 109; also restated in BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 117.
113. BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 113. This principle is a mainstay for CRM and has been
restated in SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, ¶ 104 and ultimately codified
also in BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 119.
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protection, for instance, due to insufficient value of the collateral,
security instruments may result in capital charges that correspond to
those applied to unsecured credit. 114 In such circumstances, even
though the security instrument could still be taken into account for the
purpose of calculating banks’ economic capital, capital requirements
effectively increase.
From the foregoing discussion, it becomes apparent that the
traditional narrative advocating that the use of collateral broadens
access to credit by reducing its cost does not stand on firm ground.
The sole existence of a security right over an asset, even though
reducing credit risk, does not result per se in a reduced capital charge.
In fact, while collateralized transactions are intended to offer credit
protection, they also generate new risks, including legal risk,
hindering the exercise of secured creditors’ rights; operational risk,
arising from faulty procedures to monitor or evaluate collateral; and
liquidity risk, arising from the difficulties in the disposal of
collateral. 115 A security right reduces a capital charge below the level
of that applicable to unsecured loans only if it complies with
prescriptive regulatory requirements ensuring the soundness of
individual banks and the stability of the entire banking system. Thus,
it is key to elicit such requirements.
Under the Basel framework, to determine whether a given CRM
technique corresponds to reduced capital charges, banks have to
deploy specific procedures articulated either in the standardized
approach or, if authorized by national regulators, in one of the two
IRB variants. Subsequently, depending on the methodology adopted,
various provisions apply to determine if a given type of transaction
constitutes an eligible credit protection and its corresponding
coefficient for the computation of the risk-weighted capital charge.116
114. There are some exceptions to this rule and in some instances non-eligible CRMs
may also result in lower capital charges, as it occurs in the case of past due loans. See BASEL II,
supra note 12, ¶ 77. Nonetheless, Basel III adopts a more conservative approach and only
collateral and guarantees considered eligible for CRM purposes may be taken into account to
lower capital charges. See BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 94. In any respect, the application of
these exceptions does not affect the regulatory treatment of security rights here examined.
115. BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 115 and BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 122.
116. This may occur in different fashions. In general, if a coefficient is not statutorily
attributed to a specific operation, the risk-weight of the collateralized transaction results from
the reduced exposure calculated after the CRM, multiplied by the risk-weight of the
counterparty; BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 148 and BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 162.
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In this context, the regulatory treatment of security rights over
financial assets, receivables and tangible goods is examined and the
implication of the lack of coordination between secured transactions
law and capital requirements is unveiled.
A. The Regulatory Treatment of Secured Transactions
The rationale and the inner logic of capital requirements are
embedded in the requisites for eligible credit protections enshrined in
the Basel framework and implemented in the EU by the Capital
Requirements Directive (“CRD IV”) and the CRR. 117 The CRD IV
and the CRR are essential components of the European Single Rule
Book and apply to any bank operating in the European single market,
extending to the European Economic Area. These two texts of EU
secondary legislation – and, in particular, the CRR for the purpose of
determining capital requirements – recurrently entrust the European
Banking Authority (“EBA”) with the tasks of defining guidelines and
drafting technical standards. 118 The latter are then to be adopted by
the European Commission through delegated or implementing acts,
pursuant to relevant Treaty provisions and procedures. 119 The
resulting level of legal harmonization substantially limits national
discretion and offers grounds for a more accurate analysis of the
regulatory treatment, under different methodologies, of the most
common types of collateralized transactions.

117. CRD IV, supra note 14; CRR, supra note 14.
118. In particular, the EBA, like the other European Supervisory Authorities, may draft
Regulatory Technical Standards and Implementing Technical Standards. See arts. 10 & 15 of
Council Regulation 1093/2010, Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European
Banking Authority), 2010 O.J. L. 331/12.
119. Notably under arts. 290 & 291 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (c. 326) [hereinafter TFEU]. On
the regulatory powers of the EBA, see Paul Craig, Comitology, Rulemaking and the Lisbon
Settlement: Tensions and Strains, in RULEMAKING BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: THE
NEW SYSTEM FOR DELEGATION OF POWERS 195 (Carl F. Bergström and Dominique Ritleng
eds., 2016). On the legal basis and powers of the European Supervisory Authorities, see Niamh
Moloney, European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience, 51 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 1609 (2014); Elaine Fahey, Does the Emperor Have Financial Crisis Clothes?
Reflections on the Legal Basis of the European Banking Authority, 74 MOD. L. REV. 581
(2011).
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The CRR identifies two requisites for CRMs to mitigate credit
risk and thus discount capital charges. 120 First, assets have to be
included in the list of “eligible collateral” contained in the CRR.121
Second, they have to be “sufficiently liquid” with a stable value over
time. 122 Moreover, banks should demonstrate – through written and
independent legal opinions – that they have the right to liquidate (or
retain) the collateral promptly in the event of the debtor’s default or
insolvency in all relevant jurisdictions. 123 The intent of these general
provisions is to ensure that lower capital charges correspond to lower
levels of credit and liquidity risk by focusing on the effective
realization of the value of the collateral. The legal certainty and the
enforceability of a security right are of paramount importance in this
context. These principles permeate the bulk of provisions concerning
different classes of collateral and types of transactions, and ultimately
design a regulatory framework that privileges security rights on liquid
assets, such as financial instruments, over less liquid tangible assets.
Upon these premises, Article 197 of the CRR contains a list of
eligible collateral, such as gold, cash and financial instruments
deposited in accounts held by the lending institution extending the
secured loan. 124 In addition, cash on deposit or assimilated
instruments that are “held by a third party institution in a noncustodial arrangement and pledged to the lending institution” may
constitute eligible collateral. 125 In taking this asset-specific approach,
these provisions of the CRR do not take into account the practice of
120. The regulatory framework for CRMs is contained in BASEL II and their treatment is
specified for each methodology. The framework is currently under revision following the
SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23. The CRR already contains some of the
proposed changes.
121. CRR, supra note 14, art. 194(3)(a).
122. Id., art. 194(3)(b).
123. Id., arts. 194(1) & (4).
124. The list also includes a variety of equity and debt finance instruments, issued by
governments and institutions rated by credit rating agencies authorized under EU law, listed in
recognized stock-exchanges, or that qualify as senior debts. See CRR, supra note 14, art. 197.
The blueprint of this list is put forward in BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 145-146. The CRR
already encapsulates the proposed amendments advanced by the Basel Committee in the
SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, ¶ 132 and now codified in BASEL III,
supra note 13 ¶ 148.
125. CRR, supra note 14, art. 200(a). CRR arts. 200(b) & (c), also provides that “life
insurance policies pledged to the lending institution” and “instruments issued by third party
institutions which will be repurchased by that institution on request” may be used as eligible
collateral.
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taking a security right over the entire business, which is common in
English law (under floating charges) and contemplated by the EBRD
Model Law in the form of an enterprise charge. The ability to
evaluate, control and promptly convert collateralized assets into cash
is a common feature of the listed assets. Hence, lending operations
backed by these assets allow the curbing of credit risk while
maintaining a sufficient level of liquidity, given that the repayment of
a loan is protected by assets that are either equivalent to or promptly
convertible into cash. 126 Moreover, some of these assets may be repledged by the secured creditor to secure its own borrowing, giving it
an additional source of liquidity. 127 It follows that, when a security
right in these assets is established, a reduced capital charge is justified
from a (micro and macro) prudential perspective. In the EU, these
assets partially overlap with the legal category of “financial collateral”
set forth in the FCD. 128 In this respect, the FCD, by limiting legal
formalities to establish and transfer financial collateral and by
facilitating swift and efficient enforcement mechanisms in case of a
debtor’s default or insolvency, 129 dovetails with the CRR and
contributes to preserving financial stability through the maintenance
of sufficient levels of liquidity in financial markets.
Security rights over tangible assets and receivables may be
considered in the computation of risk-weighted capital charges only
under the IRB methodologies. Such an approach has been introduced
126. In line with BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 145-146, the CRR defines a detailed set of
approaches and methodologies to compute the impact of different forms of financial collateral
on capital requirements. CRR art. 222 defines the “financial collateral simple method” to
calculate capital requirements under the standardized approach; whereas CRR art. 223 sets out
the “financial collateral comprehensive method” to be used under different methodologies. The
list of eligible collateral considered here and contained in CRR art. 197 applies to all methods
and approaches.
127. FCD, supra note 36, art. 5(1). On the right of the secured creditor to use financial
collateral under FCD, see GEOFFREY YEOWART & ROBIN PARSONS, YEOWART AND PARSONS
ON THE LAW OF FINANCIAL COLLATERAL ch. 11 (2016).
128. FCD, supra note 36, art. 1, ¶ 4(a), defines financial collateral as cash, financial
instruments or credit claims. In the CRR, the treatment of financial collateral as credit
protection is further specified under art. 207. However, the CRR is not limited to credit claims
but recognizes a defined broader category of receivables (art. 199), further regulated under art.
209. On financial collateral, see HUGH BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, ¶¶ 3.01ff.
129. FCD, supra note 36, arts. 4 & 8. The FCD recognizes two fundamental remedies
that may be exercised against financial collateral, namely the power of sale and appropriation,
the former being most commonly used. See YEOWART & ROBIN PARSONS, supra note 127, ¶¶
4-01 & 12-06.
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with Basel II and it remained almost unaffected with the adoption of
the final version of Basel III. The CRR establishes a series of detailed
provisions that are regrouped here into two sets of requirements. The
first set of requirements, enumerated in Article 209(3) of the CRR,
defines the risk management procedures that banks must deploy in
order to benefit from reduced capital charges. 130 Banks must conduct
a regular assessment of the credit risk associated with receivables,
including an evaluation of the credit practices adopted by the
debtor.131 They must ensure that the difference between the amount of
the exposure and the value of the receivables reflects the costs of
enforcement and the risk associated with their concentration in the
bank’s overall portfolio. 132 Encumbered receivables should also have
a limited correlation with the solvency of the debtor. 133 Moreover,
certain forms of receivables, due to their nature, are simply
considered ineligible for CRM purposes. 134
For security rights over tangible assets, termed “physical
collateral,” 135 the first set of requirements also relates to the ability of
banks to manage the risks arising from their deployment with a
particular emphasis on liquidity risk. Regulators are concerned with
the processes that banks use to assess the value of given physical
collateral in relation to the secondary market in which they can be
liquidated. 136 Publicly available data on market prices, estimations of
expected time and costs needed to dispose of the asset are required to
both prove the existence of a sufficiently liquid market and assess the

130. The CRR provision mirrors BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 516-520. The provisions
have been maintained in BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 290-294.
131. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(3)(a).
132. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(3)(b).
133. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(3)(c).
134. These include receivables connected with securitizations, sub-participations and
credit derivatives, and receivables from affiliates of the borrower, such as subsidiaries and
employees. See CRR, supra note 14, arts. 199(5) & 209(3)(d).
135. CRR, supra note 14, art. 199(1)(c).
136. These principles are also contained in BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 521 & 522. In
this regard, BASEL III largely retains these core requisites, with a relevant difference: national
regulators lost the discretionary power to compile a list of collateral that are automatically
considered to meet the market conditions to be treated as eligible collateral. See BASEL III,
supra note 13, ¶¶ 295 & 296. This change, although it reflects the efforts of the Basel
Committee to reduce national discrepancies, represents a further barrier to the use of personal
property as collateral.

572

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:531

amount that is expected to be recovered. 137 Although delegated acts
may identify the types of physical collateral for which market and
value conditions can be considered automatically met, 138 the EBA
communicated that there are no types of collateral for which these
conditions could be assumed, requiring banks to conduct case-by-case
evaluations. 139 Furthermore, banks are also required to demonstrate
that they have procedures to monitor regularly and objectively any
change in the value of the collateral. 140 As a further protection, the
collateral must be insured against the risk of damage. 141 These
prescriptions lie outside the scope of secured transactions law.
However, compliance with these requirements alone corners the
parties’ autonomy, notably by limiting the level of risk banks may
take if the security instrument is to reduce capital charges. As a result,
banks may be dis-incentivized to enter into secured transactions or
they may do so at a higher cost.
The second set of requirements relates more directly to the
features of the law governing secured transactions. In line with the
necessity of ensuring effective credit protection, banks should assess
and demonstrate, by means of independent legal opinions, the legal
certainty of their rights over receivables and physical collateral. 142
Specifically, the regulatory framework focuses on three central
aspects, i.e. perfection, priority and enforceability in case of default.
To provide eligible credit protection, a security right over these types
of collateral (and the claim to proceeds deriving from their
liquidation) should have priority over all competing claimants with
the exception of statutory claims identified in national laws. 143 From
137. CRR, supra note 14, art. 199(6). Moreover, CRR art. 199(6)(d) provides that a bank
should demonstrate “that the realised proceeds from the collateral are not below 70 per cent of
the collateral value in more than 10 per cent of all liquidations for a given type of collateral.”
This evidences the attention to the value of the collateral, which is determined in relation to
market analyses.
138. CRR, supra note 14, art. 199(8).
139. See Rules and Guidance, EUR. BANKING AUTH., Rules and Guidance,
www.eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-disclosure/rules-and-guidance
[https://perma.cc/6VDT-E4CC] (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
140. CRR, supra note 14, arts. 210(c) & (g).
141. Id. art. 208(5).
142. Id. arts. 209(2)(c) & 210(a).
143. Id. arts. 209(2)(b) & 210(b). BASEL II, supra note 12, refers to the necessity of
having first priority on collateralized transactions (in general) at ¶ 513, and on physical
collateral at ¶ 522. The same requisites are indicated in BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶¶ 287 & 296.
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the combined examination of the provisions defining the eligibility
requisites for receivables and physical collateral, it emerges that a
secured transactions regime should enable banks to enforce a security
right swiftly. These general requirements set the guidelines for
detailed rules that define narrow contours for a collateralized
transaction to qualify as eligible credit protection and result in a
reduced capital charge.
B. The Interactions between Secured Transactions Law and Capital
Requirements
Capital requirements, in defining the requisites for credit
protection, delineate a specific regulatory understanding of security
rights. Such an understanding is consistent in several aspects to the
one advanced in modern secured transactions laws. However, a series
of inconsistencies emerge regarding the execution of security
agreements, the rights and obligations of the parties, and the
enforcement and publicity regime of security rights.
First, the CRR and the Basel framework require the security
agreement to contain a detailed description of the physical
collateral; 144 thus implying that a detailed description is a proxy for
exercising control. Such a requirement may be reasonable when the
collateral is a discrete item of property, say, a piece of equipment, but
could be rather cumbersome if the debtor is, for instance, a company
that owns a variety of similar items. The assumption is that a detailed
description would allow for a prompt identification of the collateral
and its segregation from other assets that may either be unencumbered
or subject to other security rights. Thus, theoretically, banks should
enjoy greater control over physical collateral that can be readily
identified and separated from other assets in the event of default.
However, from a practical standpoint, a contractual formula
identifying collateral as “all assets” or a description by type or
category would achieve the same end in a more effective manner.
Such descriptions, in fact, allow secured creditors to identify and take
control of collateral upon default by circumventing the cost of a
precise identification and expediting the enforcement of their right. It
is for this reason that the UNCITRAL and EBRD Model Laws
144. CRR, supra note 14, art. 210(d) reflecting BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 522 and, now,
contained in BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 287.
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recognize that reference to “all assets” or to all movable assets within
a category, suffices. 145 Similarly, English common law, the Belgian
Pledge Act and the new provisions regulating the non-possessory
pledge in Italy only require encumbered assets to be sufficiently
identified or identifiable. 146 Accordingly, the CRR embraces a
position that is discordant with a trend promoted by international softlaws and embraced by national laws, in favor of an approach that
considers encumbered assets in isolation, rather than considering
them as part of a growing concern. In most cases, the sale of business
as a whole would generate more value than an item-by-item disposal.
The CRR effectively supplants national secured transactions law by
establishing more stringent standards applicable to banks that seek to
reduce capital charges. Nonetheless, such a position does not appear
to be sustained by prudential concerns. If anything, a detailed
description of the collateral, by inducing the parties to single out
specific assets, limits the efficacy of such credit protections by
increasing the costs of monitoring and enforcement, with a
consequent surge in operational and legal risks. In contrast, generic
descriptions allow banks to manage those risks more effectively.
A second issue relates to the right granted to banks to conduct
regular inspections of physical collateral. 147 Secured transactions laws
may specifically recognize such a right or may simply facilitate its
exercise by leaving the definition of the manner in which inspections
should be carried out to private negotiations. 148 Under the
UNCITRAL Model Law, a secured creditor may inspect the collateral,
but defers to the parties agreement to determine what would constitute
a reasonable time for inspection and whether a prior notice is

145. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 9; EBRD MODEL LAW, supra
note 43, art. 5.5. Contrast with U.C.C. § 9-108(c), under which “super-generic” collateral
descriptions, such as “all assets,” are not sufficient. See also HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note
44, at 150.
146. On English law, see GOODE, supra note 3, ¶ 2-05. In Belgium, see Belgian Pledge
Act, supra note 29. In Italy, Italian Non-possessory Pledge Law, supra note 31, art. 1(2).
147. CRR, supra note 14, arts. 210(g) & (h); BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 522 and BASEL
III, supra note 13, ¶ 287.
148. See EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 15.4.3 (imposing no limitations on the
right of the secured creditor to inspect collateral in possession of the debtor). Similarly, under
the new Belgian regime, the secured creditor may inspect the collateral at any time. Belgian
Pledge Act, supra note 29, art. 16.
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required. 149 Other than providing for a security agreement to include a
right to conduct regular inspection, the Basel Accords and the CRR
are silent on how banks can effectively exercise such a right. On the
one hand, the absence of specific provisions may be explained as an
attempt to both concede some freedom to the parties and provide
more room for maneuver to national laws. On the other hand, the
CRR does not appear particularly concerned with the parties’ freedom,
nor is it conscious of the variety of legal solutions offered by national
legal regimes. In fact, capital requirements, in different circumstances
reflecting their operational logic, overrule party autonomy with
detailed prescriptions regarding banks’ risk-management processes.150
Therefore, reference to a right to inspect merely restates a general
principle hosted in most legal systems without adding much to solve a
debate on how this right could (or should) be exercised, or whether a
requirement to inform the debtor prior to any inspection would impair
the effectiveness of the credit protection. The lack of such a provision
– within a detailed regulation that is zealously concerned with the
mechanisms that ensure monitoring of the value of collateral –
appears to fall short of an essential element expected for the prudent
management of credit risk.
The juxtaposition of the provisions enumerating the eligibility
requisites for receivables and physical collateral reveals enforcement
mechanisms as a third area of dissonance between secured
transactions law and capital requirements. As a general principle,
capital requirements establish that banks should be able to swiftly
enforce their rights by retaining or liquidating collateral in the event
of the financial distress or insolvency of the debtor. 151 For financial
collateral, the CRR conforms to the provisions contained in the FCD
whereby the enforcement of a security right over these assets should
not be subjected to formal requirements. 152 For security rights in
receivables arising from commercial transactions, banks should have
the right to dispose of them without needing the consent of the

149. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 55(2). A similar disposition is also
contained in the DCFR ch. IX, § 5.201(2).
150. See, e.g., supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
151. CRR, supra note 14, art. 194(4).
152. FCD, supra note 36, art. 3.
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receivables obligors. 153 If the contract generating a receivable
contains a clause banning any assignment – and such clause is
recognized by the applicable law, as is the case under the English
common law – a bank would be prevented from taking a security right
in that receivable. 154 A rule that overrides the contractual freedom of
the parties to restrict assignment has become ubiquitous in various
secured transactions laws, including the UNCITRAL Model Law. 155
Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Model Law allows the secured creditor
to collect encumbered receivables even before default with the
consent of the grantor. 156 For security rights in physical collateral, the
Basel Accords and the CRR require banks to ensure that the value of
the collateral may be realized within a reasonable timeframe. 157 The
CRR does not prescribe any specific enforcement approach. Hence, as
long as remedies are expeditious, whether through extra-judicial or
judicial enforcement mechanisms or alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, they may satisfy the regulatory expectation for a
security right to be realizable within a reasonable timeframe. This is
in line with the position of the UNCITRAL Model Law that
recognizes the importance of swift enforcement mechanisms. 158 In
contrast, the EBRD Model Law imposes formalities that may delay
153. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(2)(f); BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 520 and BASEL III,
supra note 13 ¶ 294. For the purposes of UCC Article 9 and the Canadian PPSAs, receivables
obligors would be equated with account debtors.
154. For a cogent critique of the issues posed by these clauses, see Hugh Beale, Louise
Gullifer & Sarah Paterson, A Case for Interfering with Freedom of Contract? An EmpiricallyInformed Study of Bans on Assignments, 3 J. BUS. L. 203 (2016). Clauses restricting
assignments may be in the nature of a complete bar or a limited restriction, to the effect that
assignment can only be to companies in the same group as the assignor. See Michael Bridge,
The Nature of Assignment and Non-Assignment Clauses, 132 L.Q.R 57 (2016).
155. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 13; EBRD MODEL LAW, supra
note 43, art. 5.4; DCFR ch. IX, § 2:104(2). All are not limited to receivables and provide that
generally a security right may be created in an asset even if its owner has agreed not to transfer
it. French and German laws also override contractual restrictions on assignments of
receivables in commercial contracts. See Beale, Gullifer & Paterson, supra note 154, at 227.
Belgian law similarly renders anti-assignment clauses ineffective against third parties. Belgian
Pledge Act, supra note 30, art. 64. For Canada, see CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 3,
at 113. Gilmore notes that even prior to the enactment of UCC 9, contract rights moved to
being completely assignable at law. GILMORE, supra note 25, at 213.
156. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 82.
157. CRR, supra note 14, art. 210(a).
158. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 73(2). Belgian law also recognizes
the ability of the secured creditor to enforce its rights extra-judicially as long as it proceeds in
a commercially reasonable manner. See Belgian Pledge Act, supra note 29, art. 47.
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the enforcement beyond a reasonable timeframe by requiring
registration of an enforcement notice and by suspending the final
disposal of the collateral for at least 60 days after delivery of the
enforcement notice to the debtor. 159
Fourth, with respect to priority, capital requirements are
trenchant and essentially associate reduced capital charges only to
security rights with first priority. 160 The Basel Accords and the CRR
do not prescribe any specific mechanisms to achieve highest priority,
probably in consideration of the disharmonious solutions offered at
the national level. 161 For instance, clear priority rules are commonly
defined for security rights in the original collateral but they may be
uncertain when the collateral is subsequently transferred, transformed
or commingled. Due to the limited scope of application of the EBRD
Model Law, the proceeds of collected receivables deposited in a bank
account held with another financial institution have an uncertain
priority status. 162 Conversely, the UNCITRAL Model Law extends
the priority status of a security right over receivables to their
proceeds. 163 The clarity of priorities may be further clouded when
preferential claims are not set forth in a manner that allows secured
creditors to assess the hierarchical status of their claims. A secured
transactions law that embraces the regulatory understanding of
security rights as devices to mitigate credit risk should state any
preferential claims affecting the priority of secured creditors. This is
the position advanced by UNCITRAL. 164 Such an approach appears
to be a rarity, given that in most legal systems preferential claims are
scattered in various legislative texts, often attesting to political
considerations. This is evidenced by the diverse ranking of employees’
preferential rights across European legal systems. 165
159. EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 43, arts. 33.1.6 & 24.1 (Supplementary
Registration Statement) & art. 24.1 (Measures for Realisation of Charged Property).
160. CRR, supra note 14, arts. 209(2)(b) & 210(b).
161. See José M. Garrido, No Two Snowflakes are the Same: The Distributional
Question in International Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 459 (2011).
162. The EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 5.10, extends the priority of the charge
only to proceeds of an insurance policy on the charged goods.
163. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 32; see also DCFR ch. IX, §§ 4:1044:105.
164. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 34. Neither the EBRD MODEL LAW
nor the DCFR contain a similar provision.
165. In the United Kingdom, expenses of the administrators and employees’ claims –
together with the prescribed part for unsecured creditors – have priority over floating charges
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A fifth issue that defines the concomitant application of these
two branches of the law relates to filing requirements and its effects
on security rights. Basel Accords and the CRR do not directly specify
when a security right is perfected and what formalities should be met
to consider a security instrument an eligible CRM. 166 However, the
EU regulatory framework governing “specialized lending” suggests a
specific regulatory understanding of the function attributed to
registration and filing requirements. Specialized lending comprises
various financing operations to finance physical assets and for which
the primary source of repayment is the income generated by those
assets, including power plants, aircraft objects and various
commodities inventories. 167 Without much consideration of the
different national rules governing registration and perfection of nonpossessory security rights, the EBA specifies, “[a] lien is perfected by
registering it with appropriate statutory authority so that it is made
legally enforceable and any subsequent claim on that asset is given a
junior status.” 168 Such a provision reflects common national and
international secured transactions laws that impose registration as the
only mechanism to perfect security rights in specific assets, like

but not over fixed charges. See Insolvency Act, supra note 53; Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40
(U.K.). In France, according to CODE DU TRAVAIL [C.TRAV.] art. L 3253-2, and CODE DE
COMMERCE [C.COM] art. L 625-7 & L 625-8, the preferential rights of employees enjoy a
super-priority claim over all claims, including security rights. In Italy, although the preferential
rights of employees under art. 2751-bis of the CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] are subordinated to
pledges, there is a plethora of preferential claims, scattered in various specialized provisions,
which outrank certain categories of security rights.
166. BASEL II refers, by way of examples, to the fact that registration may be a legal
requirement. See, e.g., BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 123. This position is also maintained in the
SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, ¶ 125 and has been ultimately codified in
BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 140. The CRR does not contain any reference to registration in the
context of non-possessory security rights, whereas it requires timely registration of a mortgage
in art. 208(2)(a).
167. Eur. Banking Auth. (EBA), Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Assigning
Risk Weights to Specialised Lending Exposures under Article 153(9) of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation – CRR) (EBA, Consultation Paper
EBA/CP/2015/09, 2016). The final draft of this document is currently being examined by the
European Commission for final approval.
168. Id. at 34, n. 43. Emphasis has been added to highlight the term lien that appears to
be used as a synonym of security interest. The quoted text is repeated throughout the document
and is contained in the footnotes every time the locution “first perfected security interest” is
used.
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aircraft and immovable property. 169 It also coincides with the general
provisions on security rights in personal property as adopted in certain
legal systems, including Belgium, France, Italy, as well as those
countries following the EBRD Model Law. 170
Nonetheless, the idea that registration is the sole mechanism to
both render security rights effective and govern their priority is not in
line with the approach adopted in various secured transactions law
regimes. Following a rigid interpretation, a security right that is
perfected without registration, or for which registration does not
exclude the existence of entitlements with a higher priority – two
common scenarios – may not lead to a discounted capital charge. For
instance, under English law, registration does not govern priority;
registered floating charges are subordinate to subsequently registered
fixed charges (unless a negative pledge has also been registered with
the floating charge) and, in trade finance, security rights are
commonly perfected by taking possession of the bill of lading or other
document of title. 171 Hence, the classic English adage that states
“fixed charge is for priority, floating charge is for control,” 172 does
not resonate with the concept of credit protection advanced in capital
requirements, where the two elements, i.e. priority and control, should
be concurrent rather than exclusive. In practice, this conceptual
169. See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment ch. IV, Nov. 16,
2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285; Roy Goode, Private Commercial Law Conventions and Public and
Private International Law: The Radical Approach of the Cape Town Convention 2001 and Its
Protocols, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 523, 526 (2016).
170. According to the EBRD MODEL LAW, registration is a requisite to create one of the
three types of charges, i.e. the “registered charge;” EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 44, art. 6.1.
In Italy, to establish a non-possessory pledge the agreement needs to be registered. Italian
Non-possessory Pledge Law, supra note 32, art. 1(4). However, there are other security
instruments that do not require registration. For an overview, see Giuliano G. Castellano, The
New Italian Law for Non-possessory Pledges: A Critical Assessment 9 BUTTERWORTHS J.
INT’L BANKING & FINANCIAL L. 542 (2016). In France, registration is often considered as a
substitute for dispossession. See Rapport de Mme Cohen-Branche, Conseiller Rapporteur,
Cour de Cassation (Assemblée Plénière), Nov. 6, 2009, no. 582 (08-17.095) [Report by Mrs
Cohen-Branche, Reporting Judge, Court of Cassation (Plenary Assembly)]. In contrast, in
Belgium, the parties may create an enforceable pledge upon execution of an agreement.
Belgian Pledge Act, supra note 29, art. 2.
171. On floating charges, see supra note 51 and accompanying text. On perfection by
taking possession of a negotiable document, including a bill of lading, see UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 26.
172. Riz Mokal, Liquidation Expenses and Floating Charges – The Separate Funds
Fallacy, L.M.C.L.Q. 387, 397 (2004) (referring to Jay L. Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in
Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004)).
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separation elaborated by English common law is circumvented by
combining floating charges, fixed charges and negative pledges.
However, resorting to multiple legal instruments increases legal risk,
as compliance with several formal requirements should be ensured
and interpretative doubts may arise. 173 Hence, the different treatment
for fixed and floating charges, emerging from the necessity to balance
the interests of different affected parties, 174 does not offer a
prudentially sound legal solution.
IV. THE UNFOLDING CONSEQUENCES
Secured transactions law and capital requirements affect lending
behaviors simultaneously. Although there are some difficulties in
determining the exact impact of secured transactions law on the
availability and cost of credit, 175 empirical analyses have found a
positive correlation between legal reforms facilitating secured
transactions and availability of credit. 176 However, mirroring the scant
attention to the connection between secured transactions law and
prudential regulation, these studies – ascribed to the “law and finance”
stream of literature – primarily focus on the correlation between
enhancements in the protection of creditors’ rights and access to
external finance. 177 Similarly, the banking industry associates a
173. For instance, there were some concerns over the effectiveness of negative pledge
clauses and whether registration of such clauses could be inferred as a sufficient notice
rendering them effective against third parties. See PETER E. ELLINGER, EVA LOMNICKA &
CHRISTOPHER V. HARE, ELLINGER’S MODERN BANKING LAW 849 (5th ed. 2011). The
problem has been largely resolved by the Companies Act, 2006 (Amendment of Part 25), c. 46,
Regulations 2013, no. 600 (U.K.). See Louise Gullifer & Magda Raczynska, The English Law
of Personal Property Security: Under-reformed?, in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 271.
174. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
175 . For a complete account of the most important findings in this field, see John
Armour et al., How Do Creditor Rights Matter for Debt Finance? A Review of Empirical
Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURED FINANCING IN COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 3 (Frederique Dahan ed., 2015).
176. It has also been noted that secured transactions law reforms have a greater positive
impact on the availability of credit than insolvency law reforms. Id. at 13. See generally Rainer
Haselmann, Katharina Pistor & Vikrant Vig, How Law Affects Lending, 23 REV. FIN. STUD.
549 (2009).
177. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J.
FIN. 1131 (1997); see also Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 111340 (1998). More sophisticated analyses in this field consider a broader range of protections
given to creditors. See generally John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence
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reduction of credit availability and economic growth with the
introduction of tighter capital requirements – thus implying a tension
between economic growth and financial stability as earlier
discussed. 178 Nonetheless, official and independent studies confute
this position, stressing that the long-term benefits of a more stable
banking system to stimulate lending and sustain growth. 179 How
credit is distributed in accordance with legal systems that have
modernized their domestic secured transactions laws while
implementing capital requirements is empirically untested. Drawing
from the analysis conducted thus far, it is possible to advance several
significant considerations on the broader consequences of an
increased availability of credit in jurisdictions deploying international
capital standards for banks, with the intent to further empirical
analyses.
While capital requirements apply exclusively to regulated credit
institutions, secured transactions laws allow any individual or entity
to act as a secured creditor. It stands to reason that the implementation
of a reformed secured transactions law is more likely to benefit those
lenders that are not affected by banking capital regulation, such as
micro-lenders, leasing and factoring companies. Rather than
understanding limited access to credit exclusively in terms of
shortcomings in security rights regimes or as a consequence of capital
requirements, 180 the documented reluctance of banks to take personal
property as collateral should be explained also (if not primarily) as a
function of the lack of coordination between the legal and the
regulatory frameworks under which banks manage credit risk. The
provisions on eligible collateral clearly prioritize financial
from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J.
COMP. L. 579 (2009).
178. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
179. Different studies note that an increase of capital requirements has minimal negative
impact on global GDP. See, e.g., Patrick Slovik & Boris Cournède, Macroeconomic Impact of
Basel III (OECD Economics Department, Working Paper No. 844, 2011); See also ADMATI &
HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 5. At the national level, see Jonathan Bridges et al., The Impact of
Capital Requirements on Bank Lending (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 486, 2014).
180 . The first position is often advanced by international organizations; e.g., INT’L
FINANCE CORP. (IFC), SECURED TRANSACTIONS SYSTEMS AND COLLATERAL REGISTRIES 6-7
(2010). In the literature, see, e.g., Mehnaz S. Safavian, Firm-Level Evidence on Collateral and
Access to Finance, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS REFORM AND ACCESS TO CREDIT 119
(Frederique Dahan & John Simpson eds., 2008). On the idea that capital regulation limits
economic growth, see supra note 17 and accompanying text.

582

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:531

instruments and receivables, limiting banks’ appetite for other
collateral. For instance, security on intellectual property rights,
promoted by UNCITRAL through a special set of
recommendations, 181 may constitute an effective credit protection
only in limited circumstances, given the intrinsic difficulties in
assessing their value. In a similar vein, the suspicious attitude towards
physical collateral in the Basel framework should be ascribed to the
inherent concerns about their valuation and liquidity. 182 Historical
data on the variety of tangible assets that may be taken as collateral is
often unreliable or non-existent. Furthermore, even when reliable data
can be sourced, the value of tangible assets tends to be more directly
correlated with the borrowers’ ability to repay their obligations and
with the general economic conditions. Tangible assets are likely to
suffer depreciation, either as a result of the borrower’s default or as a
reflection of the cyclical movements of the economy.
Against this backdrop, reforming secured transactions laws is
not sufficient to broaden access to bank credit. Furthermore, the
benefits (financial stability and increased access to credit) sought by
prudential regulation and secured transactions must be measured
against the simultaneous application of their dissonant logic when
they intersect, i.e. when banks are secured creditors. The requisites for
credit protection to reduce capital charges naturally constrain the
ability of banks to take a number of assets as collateral and
incentivize them to re-allocate their resources to less risky, therefore
less capital intensive, activities. 183 The banking industry’s retraction
181. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON
SECURED TRANSACTIONS: SUPPLEMENT ON SECURITY RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(2010); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 1(3). On the relevance of security
interests in intellectual property (IP) within current social and economic frameworks, see
SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Toshiyuki Kono ed., 2017) (examining
several critical aspects, such as the relevance of IP rights and debt financing for SMEs, crossborder and international rules for taking, perfecting, and enforcing security in IP). For a
forward-looking analysis concerning future legal developments to facilitate the use of IP
licenses as collateral, see Andrea Tosato, Security Interests over IP Licenses: Comparative
Observations and Reform Suggestions, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2018). For
an early and critical investigation of legal frameworks allowing the use of software copyright
as source of (secured) financing, see KIRIAKOULA HATZIKIRIAKOS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SOFTWARE AS COLLATERAL (2006).
182. See David Clementi, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Financial
Services Authority Conference: Risk Sensitivity and the New Basel Accord (Apr. 10, 2001).
183. A limited supply of commercial loans by large European and U.S. banks was noted
during the period preceding the 2007-2008 financial crisis. See INT’L MONETARY FUND,
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from these lending operations results in a vacuum that is filled by
non-bank operators that are not subject to capital requirements. Loans
provided by non-banks often involve collateral and borrowers that are
deemed too risky for regulated credit institutions. Through the
introduction of a more favorable legal regime, borrowers previously
excluded from the credit market are more likely to receive credit,
even if at higher interest rates. It follows that by adopting a
modernized and simplified legal regime for taking security rights in
collateral, access to secured credit may be broadened; but its cost is
not necessarily reduced as a result of a greater involvement of nonbank operators. This intuition is corroborated by empirical studies that
register an increase in interest rates in connection with collateralized
loans. 184
If stimulating the development of unregulated credit markets is
an unintended effect of the interaction between these two branches of
the law, significant policy concerns emerge. Following the 2007-2008
financial crisis, it became clear that the Basel framework, while
limiting excessive risk-taking, failed to impede the diversion of banks’
capital towards (more risky) operations outside the regulatory
perimeters, 185 thus rendering the financial system more fragile and
regulatory strategies less effective. A core problem affecting the Basel
framework was – and still is – represented precisely by the
inadvertent implications caused by the common assumption of the
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 31 (2008). More recently, the retraction of the largest
US banks from the market of small business financing has been noted by Brian Chen, Samuel
Hanson & Jeremy Stein, The Decline of Big-Bank Lending to Small Business: Dynamic
Impacts on Local Credit and Labor Markets (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, 2017),
http://www.people.hbs.edu/shanson/BigBankSmallBiz_paper_20170905_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8S6V-W626] (archived Mar. 4, 2018). Furthermore, the European Central Bank
(ECB) indicated that a large portion of SMEs financing in the United States and in the
European Union is offered by non-banking institutions; see Economic Bulletin - Trends in the
External Financing Structure of Euro Area Non-financial Corporations (Eur. Cent. Bank,
Frankfurt, Germany), June 2016, at 29.
184. See, e.g., Sergei A. Davydenko & Julian R. Franks, Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter?
A Study of Defaults in France, Germany and the UK, 63 J. FIN. 565 (2008); James R. Booth &
Lena C. Booth, Loan Collateral Decisions and Corporate Borrowing Costs, 38 J. MONEY
CREDIT & BANKING 67 (2008); Sheng-Syan Chen, Gillian H. Yeo & Kim W. Ho, Further
Evidence on the Determinants of Secured Versus Unsecured Loans, 25 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT.
371 (1998).
185. Black, supra note 83, at 1058 (noting that the 2007-2008 financial crisis revealed,
inter alia, a fundamental misalignment between the incentives of regulators, regulated entities,
and other firms operating in financial markets).
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coefficients used to determine capital charges. 186 In fact, pursuant to
the risk-weighting logic of Basel II, certain assets, such as residential
mortgages (and derivative products based on them), were subject to
lower capital requirements than other investments, like corporate
borrowings. 187 As a consequence, banks had strong incentives to
invest in those assets in order to reduce their capital charges. 188
Furthermore, the low level of capital required to engage in those
investments increased banks’ leverage, increasing returns as well as
risk exposures. These distortions in relation to residential mortgages
have been partially addressed at the national level. 189 Nonetheless,
international capital requirements still dis-incentivize banks to accept
personal property as collateral, 190 whereas secured transactions law
promotes their use.
The problematic nature of this diversion is represented by the
phenomenon of “shadow banking,” which is the activity of credit
intermediation occurring completely or partially outside the banking
186. See generally, Romano, supra note 11. Capital regulation incentivizes banks to
invest in activities that are less risky, given that they cost less in terms of capital. Therefore,
the attribution of different risk-weightings and the processes to calculate capital charges shape
lending behaviors by determining banks’ preferences. See Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 6.
When capital regulation is perceived as a cost, banks may engage in practices of regulatory
capital arbitrage, that is, the exploitation of the “differences between a portfolio’s true
economic risks and the notions and measurements of risk implicit in regulatory capital
standards;” David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory
Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FINANCE 35, 40 (2000). On this
phenomenon, see also Erik F. Gerding, The Dialectics of Bank Capital: Regulation and
Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 357 (2016).
187. For a convincing illustration in the context of the financial crisis, see Romano,
supra note 11, at 13 (indicating that “a bank had to hold only $4 in capital for every $100 in
residential mortgages, but it had to hold an even lower $1.60 for every $100 in MBSs with an
investment grade”).
188. For a discussion of the unintended consequences of the Basel framework, see Viral
V. Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, How Banks Played the Leverage Game, in RESTORING
FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 83 (Viral A. Acharya & Matthew
Richardson eds., 2009); Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions,
Unintended Consequences, and Lessons for Emerging Markets (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI
Working Paper No. 392, 2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2168006.
189. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
190. For a comparison of the risk-weighting attributed to secured lending and credit
derivatives, see Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory
Incentives, supra note 6 (noting that through a credit derivative, a commercial, unsecured loan
may require the same amount of capital that is required if that very same loan were secured by
a Treasury bond issued by the US government; whereas, commercial loans secured with
personal property do not benefit from such a straightforward reduction of capital).
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system. 191 In this respect, shadow banking has been eloquently
described as a “shadow caused by the regulatory spotlight shining
elsewhere.” 192 A parallel may be drawn with the regulatory limelight
that, through the eligibility criteria for collateral, points towards
specific types of security instruments and collateral, leaving other
forms of transactions and assets in the shadow of unregulated
financial institutions, which may fully enjoy reformed secured
transactions laws.
This dynamic emerges vividly from the experience of the
People’s Republic of China. In 2007, the country reformed its law
pertaining to secured transactions to facilitate the creation and
enforcement of security rights in accounts receivable, and equipment
financing. 193 Prior to the enactment of the new law, factoring and
leasing products were largely unavailable. The establishment of a new
legal framework and a registry system maintained by the national
central bank, The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), significantly
stimulated the growth of the leasing and factoring industries. 194
Simultaneously, the uncontrolled growth of debt accumulation outside
the traditional banking system is, in China and elsewhere, one of the
primary sources of concern. 195

191. FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW
BANKING: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD 1 (2011).
192 . Julia Black, Seeing, Knowing, and Regulating Financial Markets: Moving the
Cognitive Framework from the Economic to the Social 47 (London Sch. Econ., Legal Studies
Working Paper No. 24/2013, 2013).
193. Property Law of the PRC (promulgated by Fifth Sess. of the Tenth Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), No. 62 P.R.C. LAWS, Part IV (regulating
security interests in personal property).
194 . DALBERG, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE IFC SECURED TRANSACTIONS
ADVISORY PROJECT IN CHINA 33-34 (2011) (noting that in China, “[t]he value of factoring
grew from 2.6 billion Euros in 2003 to 67.3 billion Euros in 2009, according to data from
Factors Chain International” and that the implementation, in 2009, of a registry for financial
leases propelled the development of that portion of the secured credit market).
195. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Shadow Banking and Regulation in China and Other
Developing Countries 4 (Duke Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Series 2017-8)
(indicating the reluctance of banks to lend to SMEs as one of the factors fomenting the
development of shadow banking in China). See also Dan Awrey, Law and Finance in the
Chinese Shadow Banking System, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 30 (2015) (noting that regulatory
interventions set the stage for the development and rapid growth of the Chinese shadow
banking system). For a broader perspective of the stability concerns in the regulatory
framework, see Emilios Avgouleas & Duoqi Xu, Overhauling China’s Financial Stability
Regulation: Policy Riddles and Regulatory Dilemmas, 4 ASIAN J. OF L. & SOC. 1 (2017)
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From the above, it appears that capital requirements contribute to
shaping a market for secured credit in which assets or transactions
deemed too risky to serve as eligible credit protection are instead
employed by non-bank institutions. Whether the development of this
form of credit outside the banking system is beneficial or poses a
systemic threat depends on a number of factors. 196 Shadow banking
activities in the form of asset-based lending, factoring and leasing, or
even online lending, 197 are means to increase liquidity in the real
economy and promote growth. 198 However, the uncontrolled
development of this phenomenon poses serious risks. Since shadow
banking institutions are highly leveraged, they are easily affected by
cyclical movements in the value of collateral and are prone to
liquidity shortages and defaults. Moreover, regulated banks are often
part of the shadow-banking chain, to which they provide (directly or
indirectly) funds, often by acquiring loans originated by shadow
lenders. 199 Therefore, depending on the dimension of the non-banking
(indicating the connection between the Chinese banking sector and shadow lenders as a
primary concern).
196. Professor Schwarcz analyzed the efficiencies and the market failures brought by the
shadow banking system and noted that regulation might attempt to control some of those
failures, but cannot eliminate them completely. However, regulation to limit the potential
systemic threats primarily require the reduction of opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 638
(2012). See also Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and its Legal Origins (Jan. 24,
2012), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816 (noting the connection between shadow
banking and capital arbitrage); Swati Ghosh, Ines Gonzalez del Mazo & İnci Ötker-Robe,
Chasing the Shadows: How Significant Is Shadow Banking in Emerging Markets? 3 (World
Bank, Economic Premise No. 88, 2012), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET
/Resources/EP88.pdf [https://perma.cc/78GK-7KAM] (archived Mar. 4, 2018) (indicating
excessive leverage and an amplification of pro-cyclicality, among the primary concerns posed
by shadow banking to the stability of the financial system).
197. According to Morgan Stanley, in 2014 US online lenders originated US$12 billion
in loans; Can P2P Lending Reinvent Banking?, MORGAN STANLEY (June 17, 2015),
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/p2p-marketplace-lending
[https://perma.cc/C6YVL9AL] (archived Mar. 4, 2018); Todd Baker, Marketplace Lenders are a Systemic Risk,
AMERICAN BANKER (Aug. 17, 2015, 9:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/
marketplace-lenders-are-a-systemic-risk. Dirk A. Zetzsche et al, From FinTech to TechFin:
The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. (forthcoming
2017) (indicating that through a trial-and-error process online lending platforms are perfecting
their algorithms in order to measure the levels of risk of small borrowers who, in turn, are
considered too risky by international banking regulation).
198. Ghosh et al., supra note 196, at 3.
199. Many shadow banking activities are conducted under the auspices of bank holding
companies. See Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in
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market and its connection with the banking system, systemic concerns
may arise and, more generally, an uncontrolled accumulation of debt
may lead to financial instability, as Minsky noted. 200
The concomitant application of these two branches of law leads
to two intertwined consequences. First, the effectiveness of secured
transactions law reforms is curtailed by a regulatory framework that
requires credit institutions to treat loans secured by collateral in the
same guise as unsecured credit. Second, the availability of credit is
fueled by financial institutions operating outside the banking system.
Hence, the uncoordinated intersection of secured transactions laws
and capital requirements, rather than their discrete application,
hinders both access to credit and financial stability.
V. CONCLUSION
While equally concerned with the management of credit risk,
secured transactions law and prudential regulation follow distinctive
rationales and operational logics. The legal regimes governing
security rights balance the antithetic interests of the parties affected
by those rights. Within the boundaries imposed by such a balance,
secured creditors and debtors enjoy significant freedom in negotiating
the terms of their security agreement. In addition, valuation of the
collateral, determination of the amount lent against its value, the
frequency and mechanics of inspections and the general
creditworthiness of a loan applicant are not a matter of secured
transactions law. Conversely, prudential regulation, through capital
requirements, controls the risk associated with banking activities.
Hence, for the purpose of reducing capital charges, regulatory
provisions recognize security rights as a valid form of credit
protection only when they are deemed to curb the risks of failure of
the Shadow Banking System (IMF, Working Paper No. 10/172, 2010). On the current
connection between the traditional banking sector and shadow banking activities in the
European Union, see Jorge Abad et al., Mapping the Interconnectedness Between EU Banks
and Shadow Banking Entities (European Systemic Risk Board, Working Paper Series No. 40,
March 2017). Through the lens of political economy, the connection between shadow banking
activities and the banking system is even more profound, as shadow banking entities (de facto)
participate in the creation of purchasing power, leading a distinguished economist to note that
“shadow banking is, in fact, banking, creating currency for firms.” GARY B. GORTON,
SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND 57 (2010).
200. See MINSKY, supra note 67.
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individual banks and promote the stability of the financial system. To
wit, balancing the interests of the parties affected by a security
instrument do not necessarily lead to rules – on creation, perfection,
priority, and enforcement of security rights – that accommodate the
interests of public regulation.
The regulatory treatment of security rights over receivables,
financial collateral and tangible assets reveals the depth of the
dissonances between secured transactions law and capital
requirements. These dissonances, in turn, have broad policy
implications. In this respect, the assumption that reforming the law
pertaining to security rights increases access to credit, by reducing its
costs, is questionable. An uncontrolled accumulation of debt outside
the banking system is ultimately stimulated when secured transactions
law – facilitating credit creation – and capital requirements – limiting
banks’ appetite for certain types of security instruments and collateral
– are applied concomitantly and in an uncoordinated fashion. As a
result, availability of credit remains constrained and stability concerns
emerge. Resolving these dissonances requires more than a mere
attentiveness in legal drafting. International standard-setters and
national law-makers should reconsider the policy aims and the
beneficiaries of secured transactions law and prudential regulation,
having in view that these two branches of the law intersect.

